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NEW HOUSING SUPPLY  
AND THE  
DILUTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of local housing supply conditions for social capital 
investment. Using an instrumental variables approach and data from the Social Capital 
Community Benchmark Survey, it is documented that the positive link between 
homeownership and individual social capital investment is largely confined to more built-up 
neighborhoods (with more inelastic supply of new housing). The empirical findings provide 
support for the proposition that in these localities house price capitalization provides 
additional incentives for homeowners to invest in social capital. The findings are also largely 
consistent with the proposition that built-up neighborhoods provide protection from inflows 
of newcomers that could upset a mutually beneficial equilibrium involving reciprocal 
cooperation. However, the results do not appear to be driven by selection based on inherent 
differences in social aptitudes or by Tiebout sorting. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: D71, R21, R31. 
 
Keywords: House price capitalization, social capital, homeownership,  
land and housing supply, reciprocal cooperation.
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1.  Introduction and background 
The monitoring of one’s property by friendly neighbors or watch groups, a neighbor 
holding one’s spare key, BBQ-parties among close neighbors, or a pool of trusting parents 
that look after each other’s children are all examples of club goods that are essentially the 
result of accumulated social capital among a group of involved neighbors. In this context, 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) have argued that homeowners are “better citizens” because 
homeownership creates barriers to mobility and gives individuals an incentive to invest in 
local amenities and social capital since community quality is capitalized into property values.  
Although several studies (e.g., DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Rossi and Weber, 1996) 
have indeed documented a positive link between homeownership and measures of individual 
investment in social capital, stylized facts from the Social Capital Community Benchmark 
Survey (SCCBS, 2000) suggest that homeowners may not always be “better citizens”. For 
example, while homeowners on average socially interact 30% more often than renters with 
immediate neighbors in essentially built-up neighborhoods (more than 85% developed), the 
difference between the two groups is only about 9% in an average neighborhood (45% to 55% 
developed) and there is virtually no difference between the two groups in little developed 
neighborhoods (less than 15% developed). These numbers change little when other factors – 
including the population density in the developed area – are controlled for. In a similar vein, 
homeowners are even less likely to socially interact with co-workers outside work. This result 
holds even when commuting distance and other factors are taken into account. 
How can these stylized facts be explained? More generally, what are the underlying 
motives or incentive mechanisms that drive homeowners and renters to behave differently in 
some but not all instances? DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) suggest that house price 
capitalization effects may explain the diverging behavior of homeowners and renters 
(Explanation 1). Consistent with this line of reasoning, one might also expect that the wedge 
in investment behavior between the two groups is comparably larger in more built-up places 
with more inelastic long-term supply of new housing, where house price induced incentives 
can be expected to be stronger (e.g., Hilber and Mayer, 2008).  
However, there are other plausible explanations for why homeowners and renters behave 
differently and why such differences depend on the degree of physical development. The 
stylized facts could portray a mutually beneficial equilibrium involving reciprocal 
cooperation (Explanation 2). Homeowners may have stronger incentives to engage in 
reciprocal cooperation because high costs associated with housing sales make them less 
mobile and, therefore, increase the potential benefits from an equilibrium where people help 
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each other. In more built-up places there are fewer potential newcomers that could upset such 
an equilibrium. The stylized facts could also be the outcome of a selection process or of 
Tiebout sorting. Inherently more sociable individuals may select more developed or more 
densely populated places and these sociable people could also have a comparably greater 
propensity to own in more urban settings (Explanation 3). Similarly, households may Tiebout 
sort based on their preferences for social interactions (Explanation 4).  
The empirical findings presented in this paper provide strong support for the proposition 
that individual investment in social capital is facilitated by house price induced incentives 
(Explanation 1). The findings are also largely consistent with the proposition that social 
interactions at the neighborhood level are driven by benefits arising from reciprocal 
cooperation (Explanation 2). However, reciprocal behavior alone cannot explain all of the 
results. Moreover, the findings appear to be neither consistent with the outcome of a selection 
process nor with that of Tiebout sorting (Explanations 3 and 4). 
The findings have important implications for the literature on the accumulation of social 
capital and the provision of social capital induced club goods. Previous studies suggest that 
house price capitalization may provide a mechanism to induce homeowners to take into 
account preferences of future homebuyers when voting on durable local public goods, even 
when residents are mobile (see e.g., Brueckner and Joo, 1991; Sonstelie and Portney, 1978; or 
Wildasin, 1979 for the theory and Hilber and Mayer, 2008, for evidence).1 However, in the 
case of neighborhood specific social capital, investment decisions are not reached at the 
ballot. Instead they are individual verdicts, potentially encouraging free riding behavior. One 
countervailing argument is that free riding (by selling the house) may be an unattractive 
option if access to benefits from social capital induced club goods are partially excludable and 
transaction costs associated with the sale of a property exceed the benefits derived from the 
improved neighborhood quality. The empirical evidence in this paper implies that housing 
transaction costs may indeed prevent free riding and may, therefore, encourage the provision 
of neighborhood specific social capital. Moreover, housing transaction costs may also 
encourage reciprocal cooperation, further reinforcing social capital accumulation. 
This paper provides additional support for the proposition by Hilber and Mayer (2008) 
that house price induced incentive effects may be confined mainly to places where the supply 
of land available for new development is scarce. This finding has important implications for a 
wide range of studies, for example, studies that conclude that homeowners are somehow 
                                                 
1 House price capitalization may even provide an incentive mechanism in an inter-generational sense. See, 
for example, Glaeser (1996), Oates and Schwab (1996, 1998) and Rangel (2005). 
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“better citizens” because homeownership encourages civic engagement (e.g., Hoff and Sen, 
2005; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999) or because homeowners are more motivated to control 
local government (e.g., Fischel, 2001; Dehring et al., 2008). 
 
2.  Theoretical considerations and predictions 
2.1. Definition and characteristics of neighborhood specific social capital 
Neighborhood specific social capital is defined in this paper as a connection among 
neighbors, which enables them to cooperate and which subsequently facilitates the provision 
of a number of mutually beneficial club goods.2 Neighborhood specific social capital can be 
accumulated, for example, by socially interacting with neighbors or by participating in 
neighborhood clubs. These activities enable individuals to (a) develop a common language 
with one another so that communication is easier and (b) establish relationships, for example, 
in the form of organized or spontaneous shared social activities, so that neighbors will trust 
and like each other more. While shared social activities can themselves be interpreted as 
utility-generating club goods, other club goods are the result of social capital induced trust 
and friendship. For example, trust and sympathy among neighbors enables them to provide 
club goods that are simply the product of shared private or common property (e.g., shared or 
communal gardens). Trust and sympathy can also encourage the provision of benefits in the 
form of mutually beneficial reciprocal behavior (e.g., monitoring of one’s absent property, 
holding a neighbor’s spare key, or informal child care arrangements).  
Neighborhood specific social capital has some distinct economic characteristics. While 
the process of developing interpersonal links can itself offer utility to individuals, typically 
the generation of social capital involves an investment/production phase and a subsequent 
maintenance/consumption phase. A quite sizeable social capital investment is usually needed 
to initiate the process of generating trust and friendship among involved neighbors. This 
investment includes fixed costs associated with the set up of initial meetings and club 
structures and individual variable costs related to the time spent to establish relationships with 
the involved club members. Once trust and friendship is established, a maintenance effort is 
usually sufficient to ensure the provision of social capital induced club benefits in the longer 
run. The social capital induced consumption benefits typically increase at a decreasing rate 
                                                 
2 Definitions of the term social capital differ across studies and across the social sciences. The origins of the 
term “social capital” are discussed, for example, in Manski (2000) or Durlauf (2002). For a discussion of the 
determinants of social capital and the role of social capital for economic outcomes and the well-being of people 
see, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997), Putnam et al. (1993) or Putnam (1995). See Glaeser, Laibson and 
Sacerdote (2002) for a description of the “economic approach” to social capital. Manski (2000) or Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004) provide survey articles on the economic analysis of social interactions. 
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with the number of club members. Take the example of childcare arrangements among 
trusting parents. Adding a mutually beneficial link to a small pool of parents substantially 
increases the likelihood of being able to make an arrangement when needed. Adding a link to 
a very large pool increases each member’s benefit only marginally. 
A second distinct feature of neighborhood specific social capital is that it is in practice 
partially but not fully excludable. Investors (club members) can largely3 exclude initial non-
investors (outsiders) from access to benefits derived from social capital, for example, by not 
inviting them to join a club event. However, exclusion is in practice incomplete in that it is 
often not feasible, considered unfair or in some cases irrational to exclude newcomers to a 
neighborhood who are willing to cooperate and maintain social capital. One consequence of 
this partial excludability is that net benefits derived from aggregate4 neighborhood specific 
social capital, after an initial investment period, make the location not only more attractive to 
existing residents but also to potential newcomers, increasing the demand for properties in the 
neighborhood, and – assuming that housing supply is not perfectly elastic – also increasing 
house values.5 This implies, in principle, that mobile property owners can indirectly free ride 
on other residents’ investments by selling their property.  
 
2.2. Theoretical explanations and predictions 
 
Explanation 1: House price capitalization as an incentive mechanism 
To examine the impact of house price capitalization consider first a simple formal framework 
developed by Hilber and Mayer (2008) that analyses the decision of voters whether to support 
a durable increase in local public school spending. The investment entails a commitment to 
increase school spending, financed via local taxes, over a number of periods. Hence, the 
                                                 
3 Exclusion from certain benefits is not sensible. For example, monitoring a property may not only benefit the 
absent owner but also the monitor because occurrence of crime might reduce the monitor’s own house value. 
4 To the extent that investors can exclude non-investors from access to social capital induced club good-
benefits, the aggregate level of social capital (within a club) should only be determined by club members. 
Various aggregation technologies (i.e., the mapping of individual investments in aggregate social capital) are 
conceivable. A plausible assumption may be that an individual threshold-level of trust needs to be established 
among each contributing member to facilitate the provision of a number of mutually beneficial neighborhood-
specific club goods. Increasing the individual investment beyond the threshold (that ensures membership) may 
add progressively less to the overall level of social capital. This implies a sort of weaker-link technology in 
which the least effort has the greatest marginal impact on the aggregate level of social capital and the strongest 
effort has the smallest marginal impact (Cornes, 1993). One implication of this technology is that social capital 
investments of club-members should be more or less similar in equilibrium (Sandler, 1998). As long as the 
presence of non-investors in the neighborhood does not undermine social capital accumulation, the precise 
aggregation technology is not crucial for the theoretical explanations discussed below.   
5 If neighborhood specific social capital were fully excludable and initiators chose to exclude newcomers, 
then nobody would have a social capital induced incentive to enter the neighborhood and the social capital 
induced house price premium would be zero. However, if initiators could not exclude free riders at all, not even 
initial ones, then – in the absence of any norms such as social pressure or reciprocal cooperation – everybody 
would have an incentive to free ride and social capital would not be provided in the first place. 
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benefit in form of better school quality and the tax cost accrue in the future, as well as in the 
present period. In this setting, whether the investment occurs depends on the payoff of the 
median voter. Consider the (plausible) case where the investment generates a positive net 
benefit for households with children in each period, where the marginal homebuyer has 
children, and where the extent of capitalization is positive. In this setting, all else equal, 
homeowners will always be more likely than renters to vote in favor of the investment. 
Moreover, existing homeowners without children support the investment, as long as their 
expected duration in the property is short enough. The model further predicts that these 
households should be sensitive to the extent of capitalization.  
Yet, investments in local public schools differ fundamentally from those in neighborhood 
specific social capital. In the former setting the public vote is binding for all residents, direct 
benefits accrue only to a minority of residents (households with children), while all residents 
bear the direct tax costs. In the latter setting each resident makes an individual investment 
decision that merely has private cost implications. Hence, as long as investors can largely 
exclude initial non-investors from access to social capital induced benefits, there will be a link 
between investment and direct benefits. Despite this link, homeowners can in principle free 
ride on other neighbors’ investments by not investing and selling their property. (In the case 
of local public schools, either nobody or all residents “invest”.) This implies that in the case 
of neighborhood specific social capital, nobody may initially have an incentive to invest, 
unless some “mechanism” prevents free riding. One such mechanism is the existence of 
housing transaction costs, that is, selling a property only to free ride on other neighbors’ 
investments is not an attractive option if the transaction costs exceed the benefits derived from 
social capital.6 Transaction costs of selling a house (even when excluding any other relocation 
costs) are typically quite high. For example, Haurin and Gill (2002) estimate these transaction 
costs in the U.S. as the sum of 3% of the house value and 4% of total household earning.  
In a world with high transaction costs the question then becomes whether the 
homeowner’s long-term benefits derived from social capital exceed the costs. The answer to 
this question crucially depends on the elasticity of new local housing supply, which, as will be 
argued below, can be proxied by the share of developable land in the neighborhood.  
Consider a neighborhood where renters are free to move but where transaction costs 
make existing homeowners immobile. In such a setting homeowners have greater incentives 
to invest in social capital compared to renters as long as the long-term net benefits exceed the 
                                                 
6 In a previous version of this article (Hilber, 2007) I presented a formal model to illustrate this mechanism in 
more detail. 
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initial investment costs and investors can largely exclude non-investors from access to social 
capital induced club goods. This is because homeowners can internalize the long-term net 
benefits from their investments, while renters are (at least partially) deprived of those net 
benefits since landlords can (at least partially) pocket proceeds by increasing rents.7 In this 
setting, the elasticity of new housing supply is critical for the likelihood of social capital 
investment because it affects, all else equal, the inflow of newcomers and thereby determines 
the homeowners’ long-term net benefits from social capital. In a built-up neighborhood with 
more or less perfectly inelastic supply of developable land for new housing, initial investors 
in social capital are largely protected from inflows of newcomers that would dilute the net 
benefit from that social capital in the longer run (dilution can occur either as a consequence of 
an increase in social capital maintenance costs or due to congestion effects on the 
consumption side). In contrast, in a little developed neighborhood with elastic supply (i.e., 
low opportunity costs of conversion and lax land use regulations), newly accumulated social 
capital will steer landowners to develop new housing units as long as the price exceeds the 
marginal (opportunity) cost of conversion. In the long-run, the net benefit from social capital 
is diluted to an extent that the marginal newcomer’s net benefit and the corresponding house 
price premium become very small. It is quite intuitive that in such a setting nobody has an 
incentive to make a sizeable investment in neighborhood specific social capital in the first 
place. The above theoretical considerations imply two empirically testable predictions: 
 
Prediction 1: The positive link between individual homeownership and individual 
neighborhood specific social capital investment should be stronger, all else equal, in 
more built-up neighborhoods (with more inelastic supply of new housing). 
Prediction 2: Newcomers should socially interact with other neighbors after a brief 
period (to get access to social capital induced club goods) and there should not be much 
increase in the intensity as the duration in the neighborhood increases. 
 
The expected duration in the property can be predicted to have a positive effect on 
individual investment in neighborhood specific social capital, unlike in the case of a durable 
increase in local public school spending discussed above. This is because the accumulated 
benefits derived from social capital increase with the expected length of stay, while the large 
initial burden (in the form of efforts needed to generate trust and friendship among involved 
neighbors) accrues even if the residents only have a short duration. Moreover, the benefits 
                                                 
7 This implies that investment in a neighborhood may induce renters to exit. Of course renters (and landlords) 
also face relocation costs. However, these costs are likely substantially lower than those of homeowners. 
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associated with the sale of a property at the time of exit accrue independent of whether or not 
a homeowner invests (i.e., bears the costs). Hence, the longer the expected duration, the more 
likely the investment has a positive payoff. The following should hold: 
 
Prediction 3: Individual investment in neighborhood-specific social capital should be 
positively related to the expected time until the next move. 
 
Moreover, unlike in the case of local public schools, homeowners with a short expected 
duration in the property should not react sensitively to the extent of capitalization. They will 
always be better off not investing, independent of the extent of capitalization. 
 
Explanation 2: Norms of reciprocity 
Helsley and Strange (2004) have argued that many instances of knowledge transfers are 
deliberate and reciprocal. In their theoretical setting, the ability to sustain an equilibrium 
where agents help each other depends on the probability of encountering each other again. 
Adding new agents decreases this likelihood and possibly upsets the reciprocal cooperation 
equilibrium. In the context of their setting, the authors argue that the sustainable level of 
knowledge barter crucially depends on city size. This is because withholding knowledge and 
going unpunished is easier for an agent when the city size is large. Similar reasoning can be 
applied to the case of social capital accumulation at the neighborhood level, that is, the 
stylized facts presented at the outset could be due to the fact that homeownership and land 
scarcity encourage the existence of a mutually beneficial equilibrium involving reciprocal 
cooperation among neighbors. Consider two local residents who have similar preferences for 
reciprocity: one resident is a homeowner, the other one is a renter. The homeowner has a 
longer expected duration in the property because of high property transaction costs. In this 
setting, the homeowner can be expected to be more likely to interact and provide benefits to 
other neighbors because he or she is more likely to stay long enough to be compensated in the 
future, hence, is more likely to benefit from mutually beneficial reciprocal cooperation. 
Homeowners should also have stronger incentives to socially interact in order to generate 
trust and friendship and thereby facilitate reciprocal cooperation. In contrast, renters with 
shorter expected durations are more likely to insist on immediate payment or compensation 
and have fewer incentives to socially interact. In more built-up places there are fewer 
potential newcomers that could upset a reciprocal cooperation-equilibrium. 
These theoretical considerations imply two predictions that are equivalent to the ones 
arising from Explanation 1. Prediction 1 follows directly from the above considerations. A 
rejection of this prediction would cast serious doubt on Explanations 1 and 2. One would also 
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expect Prediction 3 to hold. The willingness of an individual with preferences for reciprocity 
to socially interact should increase with the expected time until the next move, even when 
controlling for individual homeownership.8 Moreover, to the extent that the durations in the 
neighborhood and at the work place are closely related, Prediction 3 should also hold for 
social capital investments at the work place. Similarly, Explanation 2 is ambiguous about 
whether homeowners should be more likely to invest in work place-specific social capital.  
In contrast, Prediction 2 appears to be only consistent with Explanation 1 but not with 
Explanation 2. That is, to the extent that investment in neighborhood specific social capital is 
driven by benefits arising from reciprocal cooperation, one would expect that reciprocal 
cooperation (and hence social interaction) increases with the number of years in the 
neighborhood, as neighbors get to know each other better and trust each other more over time. 
Hence, Prediction 2 may help disentangle which of the two “mechanisms” (Explanation 1 or 
2) is more relevant in illuminating the stylized facts presented at the outset.  
 
Explanation 3: Selection based on inherent differences in social aptitudes 
The above explanations do not consider the possibility that households with different 
characteristics may select certain neighborhoods nor that they may Tiebout sort into 
neighborhoods that reflect their preferences. Consider first the selection mechanism. Suppose 
there are two types of individuals: party-people who like to socially interact and hermits who 
prefer solitude. The former group likely prefers – and is willing to pay more for – more 
developed and denser locations. Such a selection mechanism might explain a positive 
relationship between the share of developed land and individual investment in social capital. 
Suppose further that party-people prefer to own (e.g., because landlords would not be willing 
to tolerate loud parties), while hermits prefer to rent. To the extent this is indeed the case, 
selection could explain why homeowners are more socially interactive than renters. However, 
this mechanism would not explain why there is a wedge in social capital investment behavior 
between homeowners and renters in more developed locations but not in less developed ones. 
In order to arrive at such a prediction one would need to assume that party people are more 
likely to own in more developed places but not in less developed ones (e.g., because nobody 
cares about noise from distant neighbors in rural areas). With these rather restrictive 
                                                 
8 The correlation coefficient for the variables individual homeownership status and “expect to stay for at least 
5 more years” is +0.30 (for the full regression sample). The variable “expect to stay for at least 5 more years” is 
likely a less than perfect proxy for the expected length of stay and the homeownership variable likely captures 
additional information on the expected duration. This suggests that Explanation 2 is consistent with the finding 
that the coefficients on both variables are positive. A related issue is endogeneity. The expected duration in the 
property will likely affect the housing tenure decision. Hence, in the empirical work below an IV-strategy is 
applied to identify the causal effect of homeownership on different manifestations of social capital investment. 
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assumptions one can indeed get a prediction equivalent to Prediction 1. However, such a 
selection process would not be consistent with any of the other predictions. Moreover, if it 
were in fact the case that respondents who select more developed places and/or choose to own 
are inherently more socially interactive, one would expect that they are also inherently more 
socially interactive outside the neighborhood, for example at work (i.e., party-people at home 
are unlikely to be hermits at work and vice versa). Hence, if selection based on inherent 
differences in social aptitudes indeed explains the facts that homeowners are more socially 
interactive and that land scarcity has a positive effect on the link between homeownership and 
neighborhood specific forms of social capital, one would expect the following to hold: 
 
Prediction 4: Land scarcity should have a positive effect on the link between 
homeownership and non-neighborhood specific forms of social capital. 
 
Prediction 4 provides a falsification test. Prediction 4 is clearly inconsistent with the 
proposition that social capital investments are driven by homeowners – in contrast to renters – 
being able to internalize the net benefits from their investments (Explanation 1). Individual 
homeownership should not be linked with contributions to non-neighborhood specific forms 
of social capital as such contributions do not affect house values. Similarly, local land scarcity 
should not have a positive effect on the link between homeownership and non-neighborhood 
specific social capital investment. Prediction 4 is also inconsistent with Explanation 2. The 
behavior of individuals in non-neighborhood specific networks (e.g., at the work place) 
should not depend on the physical characteristics of the place of residence, as those 
characteristics have no effect on the likelihood of a reciprocal cooperation equilibrium outside 
the neighborhood. 
 
Explanation 4: Tiebout sorting 
Lastly, consider the case where households sort based on the sort of social relations they 
expect to enjoy. In an ideal Tiebout (1956) world, households with strong preferences for 
social interactions would sort into homogeneous communities and neighborhoods (and 
possibly even sub-networks within a neighborhood), where all households are similarly 
socially interactive. 9  In the resulting equilibrium in some neighborhoods (possibly more 
developed ones) all residents should be highly socially interactive, while in others, nobody 
should socially interact. Hence, if the observed local accumulation of social capital were 
indeed driven by Tiebout sorting, then even in highly developed locations homeowners and 
                                                 
9 Geographical borders of neighborhoods may then be set so as to capture a club membership that is optimal 
for the largest required network. 
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renters should invest similarly in neighborhood specific social capital (inconsistent with 
Prediction 1). (In fact, there should not be any neighborhoods that consist of both 
homeowners and renters.) Moreover, the Tiebout sorting mechanism and the resulting 
equilibrium do not imply Predictions 2 and 3. 
To sum up the above, evidence that favors Predictions 1 to 3 but rejects Prediction 4 
provides support for the view that individual investment in social capital is at least in part 
driven by house price induced incentives (but not by Tiebout-sorting). If reciprocal behavior 
were the predominant mechanism explaining the stylized facts, Prediction 2 should be 
rejected. If results were driven by a selection process, Prediction 4 should hold.  
 
2.3. Other determinants of social interactions  
Social interactions are, of course, influenced by many factors besides the degree of 
development in the neighborhood, the individual homeownership status, or the expected 
duration in the property. For example, characteristics related to the life-cycle status (e.g., 
having children or not) or the job situation (employment status, distance to work etc.) can be 
expected to affect an individual’s eagerness or willingness to socially interact. Moreover, it is 
quite conceivable that a number of location-specific factors affect individual social capital 
investments. For example, the population density in the developed area, which measures the 
average proximity of residents, likely affects an individual’s readiness to socially interact. 
High residential proximity may facilitate social interactions amongst neighbors because of 
shorter distances; yet, it may also create an environment of anonymity making social 
interactions among immediate neighbors less likely, especially in high-rise building 
environments. The local homeownership rate may also matter. To the extent that social capital 
investments are determined by house price induced incentives, the expected sign of the 
homeownership rate variable is ambiguous. The homeowner propensity should be positively 
related to the number of investors. Adding new investors likely first increases and then 
decreases each investor’s payoff (because of increased social capital maintenance costs or 
congestion effects). However, an increase in the share of homeowners also implies fewer 
renters who might want to leave the neighborhood, reducing, all else equal, the inflow of 
newcomers and thereby strengthening incentives to invest. In contrast, the norms-of-
reciprocity-explanation predicts unambiguously that incentives to socially interact should be 
positively influenced by the homeownership rate in the area. This is because a higher 
ownership propensity increases the chances that neighbors encounter each other again. 
Another location factor that likely affects social capital is the homogeneity of the population. 
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For example, Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) demonstrate that linguistic- and ethnic-
heterogeneity negatively affect measures of social capital.  
Finally, the inflow of newcomers to a neighborhood is likely to be influenced by demand 
side factors. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) suggest that demand for city living has increased in 
recent decades due to benefits of consumer amenities and lower crime. Strong demand in 
urban areas may encourage greater development in urbanized neighborhoods and may – due 
to the inflow of newcomers – discourage social capital investment.  Specifically, the demand 
side may be affected by variables that proxy for amenity availability (e.g., the size of the 
settlement to which the neighborhood belongs or the average household income in the area) or 
by the level of crime in the area, a proxy for a resident’s ability to enjoy social amenities. 
 
3.  Empirical analysis 
3.1. The data 
The main data source is the Restricted Use Data version of the Social Capital 
Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) undertaken by the Saguaro Seminar at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University between July 2000 and February 
2001. 10  As the survey title implies, this is the first attempt at widespread systematic 
measurement of social capital, particularly within communities. The survey measures various 
manifestations of social capital as well as its suspected correlates in 41 U.S. “communities” 
(a metro area, a city, or one or several counties). The “communities” are listed in Appendix 
Table A2.  
The empirical analysis that follows focuses on four measures of individual social capital 
investment that are particularly useful to explore the validity of the various theoretical 
explanations. These measures are the number of social interactions with immediate 
neighbors, participation in neighborhood associations, the number of social interactions with 
co-workers outside work, and participation in service and fraternal organizations. The 
suspected correlates include a number of survey respondent specific characteristics that are 
used in the empirical analysis as control variables. Specifically, the list of controls includes: 
the number of years lived in the local community, whether the respondent expects to stay in 
the community for at least 5 more years, commuter characteristics, race, gender, age, whether 
the respondent has children, household income category dummies, marital status, dummies 
for the highest education completed, and dummies for the current employment status. 
                                                 
10  The data was provided through the Roper Center of the University of Connecticut. See the survey 
documentation (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2001) for details on the survey design. 
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The Restricted Use Data version of the SCCBS (in contrast to the public use version) 
provides geographical information including Census tract identifiers for the survey 
respondents. The tract identifiers are subsequently used to merge the SCCBS with other data 
sources: the National Land Cover Data 1992 (NLCD), the Natural Amenity Scale Data 
(NASD), the NBER data repository, the 2000 U.S. Census, and the FBI’s 2000 Uniform 
Crime Reporting Program Data (UCRPD).11 Because the SCCBS Census tract information is 
based on 1990 boundary definitions, all data is geographically matched to 1990 boundaries. 
The NLCD is a 21-class land cover classification scheme – derived from satellite data –
mapped consistently over the contiguous area of the United States at a spatial resolution of 
30-meter pixels. The Wharton GIS Lab geographically matched this data to the Census tract 
level. This tract level land use data set was then used to derive the preferred proxy measure 
for the inelasticity of new housing supply in a neighborhood: the share of developed land in a 
Census tract. The measure is defined as: 
 
% Developed land (residential, commercial, industrial, transport)-Developed  =
Developable land (all land except water, ice, barren, wetlands)
. (1) 
 
The NASD provides detailed topography data at the U.S. county level. The data is derived 
from the Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture and is used to 
instrument for the share of developed land in a Census tract. Similarly, the NBER data 
repository provides data on state level mortgage subsidy rates, which are used as an 
instrument to identify a survey respondent’s homeownership status.12  
The Census provides additional control variables including the homeownership rate, the 
share of housing units in multi-unit buildings, the share of housing units in single family 
detached homes, the size of the settlement to which the neighborhood belongs, the average 
household income, the income Gini-coefficient, and measures of linguistic and ethnic 
heterogeneity. Moreover, geographically matching the Census with the NLCD provides an 
additional measure: the population density in the developed area.  
These location-specific control variables are with one exception – the population size of 
the place to which the tract belongs13 – measured at the county-level. A previous version of 
this paper used tract-level variants instead. However, any variable at the neighborhood-level 
is open to the charge that its inclusion might introduce an endogeneity bias. For example, if 
                                                 
11 ICPSR provided access to Census and FBI crime data.  
12 The NBER’s TAXSIM program calculates federal and state income tax liabilities from survey data. As a 
“side product” state-level income tax rates and corresponding mortgage subsidy rates are reported. The URL is 
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates (last accessed on July 24, 2007). 
13 Some tracts do not belong to any place. In this case, the average place size in the county is used instead. 
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ethnic homogeneity leads to greater social capital investment, then an individual who has a 
desire to build social capital may be more likely to choose an ethnically homogeneous 
neighborhood. Instrumenting for the neighborhood controls in addition to the focal variables 
of this study would be stretching the capacity of the data too far. Hence, as a compromise, the 
controls are measured at a larger geographical scale, thereby minimizing potential 
endogeneity bias. Reassuringly, whether the controls are measured at the tract- or county-
level, has no significant effect on the main findings in this paper. Finally, the UCRPD 
provides information on the murder arrest-rate in the county. 
While the total SCCBS communities-sample consists of 26,230 adults, the regression 
samples are somewhat smaller due to missing values.14 Most importantly, for some Census 
tracts that belong to the forty-one community sample, no corresponding land use data could 
be matched. The full set of variables and corresponding summary statistics of the regression 
sample are described in more detail in Table 1.  
 
3.2. Land availability and the elasticity of new housing supply  
The choice of the share developed land in a Census tract as proxy for the local inelasticity 
of new housing supply is theoretically as well as empirically motivated. To begin with, the 
sheer impossibility of converting land in built-up localities explains why highly developed 
places have more inelastic supply of new housing than locations with plenty of open space.  
The second argument is a purely mechanical one; mathematically, as long as the supply 
curve has a positive price intercept, even a linear supply curve generates a positive 
relationship between land scarcity and supply inelasticity. A positive price intercept merely 
implies that the present value of future land rents from farming is greater than zero. 
The third line of reasoning is founded in the endogenous zoning literature that considers 
land use restrictions as political outcomes determined by voting and lobbying. While owners 
of developed land have an incentive to limit new housing supply to protect the value of their 
assets, owners of undeveloped land have an interest in keeping land use regulation flexible. 
Hence, to the extent that land use controls are the outcome of a political process, new housing 
supply should be more inelastic in more developed locations where owners of developed land 
(homeowners and landlords) are more numerous and politically influential than owners of 
undeveloped land (e.g., farmers) (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2006). Consistent with this 
reasoning, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2006) provide empirical evidence that land scarcity has 
a causal positive effect on the local regulatory restrictiveness. Various other studies provide 
                                                 
14 The survey was also conducted nationally. The national sample consists of 3,003 adults. The restriction to 
the “communities” sample permits the use of community sample fixed effects for all observations in the sample. 
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support for this finding. For example, Rudel (1989) demonstrates that municipalities in 
Connecticut adopted land use laws later if they (i) are at a greater distance to New York City 
and (ii) had a greater share of farmland. Moreover, increases in restrictiveness occurred in 
those places that experienced the largest declines in farming during the 1960s. Fischel (2004) 
documents that land use regulations typically originate in the centers of large cities and then 
spread to the surrounding suburbs and towns. Finally, Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) find 
a very high “regulatory tax” for Manhattan condominiums but much lower values for the 
entire metro area. Overall, these studies overwhelmingly support the view that undeveloped 
land can be more easily converted into housing in less regulated locations at the edge of cities, 
but that conversion is costly and involves large time lags in more developed locations. 
The final argument is based on the real option literature, which assumes that land 
redevelopment is costly and developable open land therefore has an option value (Titman, 
1985; Capozza and Helsley, 1990; Capozza and Li, 1994; Novy-Marx, 2005). In such a 
setting, when a neighborhood becomes built-up, the incremental opportunity cost of adding an 
extra housing unit increases exponentially, implying inelastic supply of new housing. 
While the evidence discussed above is circumstantial, Hilber and Mayer (2008) directly 
estimate supply elasticities for locations with more and less developable land for future 
construction. Using a structural model and a well-identified strategy, their findings suggest 
that more developed communities indeed have more inelastic supply of new housing and a 
greater extent of house price capitalization of local public school spending and local 
amenities. In a similar vein, Brasington (2002) demonstrates, by splitting a sample into houses 
on the interior and the edge of the urban area, that capitalization is weaker towards the edge 
where housing supply elasticities and developer activity are greater. McDonald and McMillen 
(2000) show for Suburban Chicago that residential development is greater in areas with a 
large proportion of agricultural land. Finally, Saiz (2008) demonstrates that areas that are 
widely regarded as supply inelastic are also severely land-constrained by topography. 
 
3.3. Empirical specifications, endogeneity issues, and identification strategies 
The base specification (Specification 1) estimates – similar to previous studies such as 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) – the effect of a survey respondent’s homeownership status 
on particular measures of individual social capital investments. Two of these measures are 
neighborhood specific (social interactions with immediate neighbors15 and participation in 
                                                 
15 The survey only asks for the number of social interactions. It does not distinguish different interaction-
types or intensities. To the extent that interactions are of a negative nature, there are likely also fewer of them. A 
log-transformation of the dependent variable was performed because tests revealed that a semi-log specification 
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neighborhood associations), the other two are non-neighborhood specific (social interactions 
with co-workers outside work and participation in service and fraternal organizations). 
Specification 1 can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2
1
% .
K
k+2
k
Individual contribution to social capital =
own  developed control  kβ β β β ε
=
+ + + +∑  (2) 
 
 
The respondent’s homeownership status (own) – the focal variable in the base specification – 
is 1 if the respondent owns and 0 otherwise. All else equal, individual homeownership can be 
expected to be positively related to individual investments in neighborhood specific social 
capital 1( 0)β > . However, unless the findings are driven by selection based on inherent 
differences in social aptitudes one would not expect individual homeownership and 
investments in non-neighborhood specific social capital to be positively related. 
Besides the share developed land (% developed), the base specification consists of 
numerous location- and respondent-specific controls outlined in Section 3.1, including 
measures of the existing duration and expected length of stay in the neighborhood. The 
location controls also include community sample fixed effects (one dummy for each SCCBS-
community) to control for location specific time-invariant unobservable characteristics.  
Specification 2 differs from the base specification in that it additionally includes the 
interaction effect between the survey respondent’s homeownership status (own) and the share 
of developed land in the tract (% developed): 
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As outlined in the theory section, individual homeownership can be expected to be more 
strongly positively related to individual contributions to neighborhood specific forms of 
social capital in more developed locations 3( 0)β >  (Prediction 1). However, to the extent 
that social capital investments are driven by house price induced incentives and/or reciprocal 
behavior, one would not expect this prediction to hold for contributions to non-neighborhood 
specific forms of social capital (i.e., Prediction 4 should not hold). 
The two specifications are first estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) 16  and 
including urban and rural observations. One concern related to rural residents (outside of 
                                                                                                                                                        
achieves a better fit. One interaction was added to the total number in order to avoid loosing observations with 
zero interactions. Estimates with an untransformed dependent variable yield similar qualitative results.  
16 A linear probability model is preferred because the interpretation of interaction effects in logit and probit 
models is not straightforward (see Ai and Norton, 2003). 
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metro areas) is that they may be qualitatively different from those who choose to settle in 
more urban localities. For example, rural dwellers may desire to interact less than those who 
live in an urban tract with a similar level of development. Hence, the results may be driven by 
innate characteristics of rural dwellers. In order to address this concern, the specifications are 
re-estimated using a sample that omits survey respondents who live in rural non-MSA 
locations. As will be demonstrated below, the substantive results still hold, in fact get 
marginally stronger, for the MSA-only sample. A related concern is that rural dwellers may 
fear development less than urban dwellers in similarly developed tracts. This is because 
demand for housing is also driven by demand for amenities other than neighborhood specific 
social capital (see Section 2.3). To capture these demand side influences, the following 
variables are included in the empirical analysis: the size of the settlement to which the tract 
belongs, the average income in the county, and the murder arrest-rate in the county.  
An instrumental variables (IV) approach is used to address various endogeneity 
concerns. The first concern relates to the land scarcity variable: neighborhoods with more 
active (sociable) homeowners may enact more restrictive zoning laws and other regulations 
to preserve land and/or limit housing supply. This concern is somewhat alleviated by the fact 
that the land use data used in the empirical analysis was collected in 1992, whilst all other 
variables, including the homeownership status of the respondents and the social capital 
measures, are from 2000. Social capital investments in 2000 should not explain the share of 
developed land 8 years earlier. Secondly, if more active homeowners enact stricter zoning 
that preserves open land, one should find that the coefficient on the variable own × % 
developed has a negative sign. However, as is demonstrated below, the opposite is the case. 
Thus, the bias goes against the predicted results.17 Nevertheless, to fully address the concern, 
instruments were sought that help identify local land scarcity. These instruments should be 
strongly related to the share developed land in the tract but unrelated to the error term. 
Specifically, I use the share wetlands in the tract and a number of county specific dummy 
variables for different topography types (flat plains, smooth plains, irregular plains, 
tablelands with moderate relief, and plains with hills). The share wetlands in a tract can be 
expected to be strongly positively related to the cost of converting the remaining developable 
land in the tract into housing and, hence, all else equal, should be negatively related to the 
                                                 
17 One might also be concerned that land scarcity is related to household mobility and that the empirical 
specification might not sufficiently control for mobility. However land scarcity is positively related to intended 
mobility (i.e., households in urbanized areas are more mobile). Hence, if anything, omitting mobility would also 
bias against finding the proposed effect. Moreover, adding a variable for the interaction between individual 
homeownership and intended mobility has virtually no effect on the coefficients of the variables of interest. 
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share developed land in the tract. Similarly, the topography is expected to affect land 
conversion costs and hence, all else equal, the share developed land in an area. Plains and 
tablelands with moderate relief can be expected to have comparably low conversion costs and 
should therefore be more developed. As Wooldridge (2002) demonstrates, the product of an 
instrument for a given endogenous variable and an exogenous component of an interaction 
term is also a valid instrument. Consequently, the instruments used to identify the share 
developed land are also used to identify the interaction term own×% developed.  
The second endogeneity concern relates to the variable population density in the 
developed area of the tract. Note first that this measure is quite different from the 
“conventional” population density measure. In fact the “conventional” measure (i.e., total 
population in the tract divided by the tract’s total land area including undeveloped and non-
developable land) can be decomposed into two multiplicative components: the population 
density in the developed area of the tract and the share of developed land in the tract. This 
decomposition enables separate estimation of the effect of land scarcity (potential supply of 
new housing) and the physical proximity of neighbors. One endogeneity concern related to 
the density measure used in this paper is that more sociable people could enforce minimum 
lot size restrictions that, in turn, affect the population density in the developed area. To 
address this concern, I use the following instruments: the (log of the) population density in 
the developed area of the county18 and a dummy variable that indicates whether the tract is 
located in a county with high mountains. The use of a measure of density at a more 
aggregated geographical level as instrument for tract-level density essentially follows an 
identification strategy proposed by Brueckner and Largey (2008), who use (conventional) 
density measures at the urbanized area- and at the MSA-level to identify (conventional) tract 
level density.19 The identifying assumption is that “although people may self-select across 
tracts in endogenous fashion, choice of a [more aggregated geographic area] is unrelated to 
unobservable characteristics affecting social interaction” (Brueckner and Largey, 2008). In 
the context of the empirical analysis in this paper, the assumption is that a highly sociable 
person will not move from a low to a high density county solely due to differences in the 
level of social interaction. The validity of the second instrument relies on the assumption that 
                                                 
18 The rationale for choosing the county- instead of the MSA-level is the fact that a significant fraction of 
survey respondents lives outside MSAs. While levels of social capital at the county-level may occasionally 
induce people to relocate, the identifying assumption implies that the county-area choice is influenced mostly by 
other factors such as employment related reasons. As an additional robustness check, I estimated specifications 
by limiting the sample size to the MSA-level and using the population density in the developed area of the MSA 
as an instrument for tract-level density. Results are very similar (see Appendix Table A9 for details). 
19 Largely consistent with the findings in this paper, Brueckner and Largey (2008) show that low-density 
living (urban sprawl) does not have a negative effect on social interactions. 
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in highly mountainous areas sprawl is less feasible. Hence, while population density – 
measured in a conventional way – can be expected to be low in highly mountainous localities 
(Brueckner and Largey, 2008, use a measure of the ruggedness of the MSA’s terrain to 
identify (conventional) population density, relying on the assumption that feasible 
construction densities are lower in rugged terrain), all else equal, the population density in the 
developed pockets (valley-villages) can be expected to be comparably high.20  
The third potential endogeneity issue relates to the respondent’s homeownership status. 
Omitted variables that may explain the homeownership status may also be related to the four 
measures of social capital. In order to address this concern, additional instruments are used to 
identify the respondent’s homeownership status and the variable’s interaction with land 
scarcity. The identification strategy exploits three facts: (i) homeowners in the U.S. can 
deduct mortgage interest from their income taxes, (ii) this tax subsidy differs across U.S. 
states, and (iii) the sensitivity of a household’s housing tenure decision with respect to tax 
subsidies is likely to vary by income category. Hence, the state-specific total maximum 
mortgage subsidy rate (related to both federal and state income tax) interacted with each 
income category dummy (allowing for a differential impact of the variable for different 
income groups) can be used to identify the survey respondent’s homeownership status. The 
total maximum mortgage subsidy rate (rather than using the respondent’s individual rate) has 
the advantage that it is independent of individual decisions as well as of the within state 
income distribution. The total maxim subsidy rate should explain a survey respondent’s 
homeownership propensity but should not be a function of individual social capital 
contributions. Again following Wooldridge (2002), the instruments to identify the interaction 
term own × % developed are derived as the interactions of the instruments for the 
respondent’s homeownership status and the instruments for the share developed land. 
A few other control variables can also be argued to be endogenous. Specifically, an 
individual who is more concerned with social capital investment in the neighborhood or at 
work may be less likely to locate in an area that involves a long commute and reduced time 
for investments. The expected duration in the neighborhood may also be suspect. People 
embedded in social networks may be less tempted to leave. Instrumenting for these variables 
                                                 
20 One might be concerned that high mountains proxy for beauty and this attracts environmentalists and other 
nature lovers who are simply “better people”. However, simple correlation coefficients and using the variable as 
a control (rather than as an excluded instrument) in the regressions that estimate neighborhood-specific social 
capital, cast doubt on this assertion. The correlation coefficients are not statistically different from zero and the 
coefficient on the variable when included as control is also completely insignificant. Also note that the MSA-
only sample does not include highly mountainous tracts and the instrument is consequently missing in MSA-
only regressions. Moreover, the results reported below are qualitatively similar when the instrument is dropped.  
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– in addition to the focal variables – would be stretching the capacity of the data too far. 
Hence, as a robustness check, specifications are reported with and without these suspect 
controls. As will be demonstrated below, the results – particularly the coefficients of the focal 
variables – are virtually unaffected by the inclusion/exclusion of these variables. 
Standard errors in all specifications are clustered by county as a set of instrumental 
variables used to identify the share developed land is county specific. Clustering corrects for 
within group autocorrelation and across group heteroskedasticity, implying robust standard 
errors. Finally, several instrument diagnostics and specification tests were carried out. One 
caveat with these diagnostics is that the relevant statistics can react sensitively to the model 
specification. The tests cannot prove that the chosen instruments are exogenous or valid. 
Nevertheless, they are useful to identify potential issues. The relevant results of the 
diagnostics are discussed below. Detailed results are reported in the regression tables.  
 
3.4. Regression results 
 
First-stage regression results 
Full first stage regression results are reported in Table 2 for the base specification 
without interaction effects. (Full corresponding second-stage results are reported in Appendix 
Table A3. First- and second-stage-results for the identical specifications of the MSA-only 
sample are reported in Appendix Tables A4 and A5.) The first column in Table 2 reports first 
stage regression results for the land scarcity variable, assuming that the other two focal 
variables, population density in the developed area of the tract and individual 
homeownership, are exogenous. As expected, the share wetland is significantly negatively 
associated with land scarcity, while the topography measures that indicate land that is easy to 
build on are positively associated with land scarcity. Columns (2) and (3) report results for 
the land scarcity variable and the density variable, still assuming that the homeownership 
variable is exogenous. The results for the land scarcity variable are virtually unchanged. 
Moreover, the instruments used to identify the density variable have the expected signs and 
are strongly statistically significant, that is, tracts located in densely populated counties and 
tracts that are surrounded by high mountains have higher densities in the developed areas of 
the tract. Finally, columns (3) to (6) report results assuming that all three variables are 
endogenous. Again, results for the land scarcity variable and the density variable are virtually 
unchanged. Finally, as expected, the total mortgage subsidy rate is positively associated with 
the individual homeownership status. In fact, the results suggest that respondents at the 
bottom and top end of the income distribution react somewhat more sensitively to the subsidy 
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rate compared to medium income households. This finding is quite plausible. While high-
income households benefit most – in absolute terms – from mortgage interest rate tax 
deductions, they also have higher opportunity costs of time (e.g., hedge fund managers may 
prefer to outsource maintenance and repair issues to landlords) and often are quite mobile 
(i.e., have a relatively short expected duration in their property). Hence, renting is often a 
sensible option for them as long as the mortgage subsidy rate is not too large. Low-income 
households may react particularly sensitively to mortgage interest rate subsidies because high 
subsidies may enable them to overcome the liquidity constraints that prevent them from 
buying. Middle-income families (often with children) can reasonably be expected to react 
least sensitively as the relative net-benefit of owning is highest for this group. 
 
Second-stage results: Neighborhood specific measures of social capital 
Table 3 reports estimates for the total number of social interactions with immediate 
neighbors per year. Results are reported for 12 different specifications and for the focal 
explanatory variables. The results for the numerous control variables are only reported for the 
base specification (in Appendix Table A1) as coefficients and significance levels of these 
controls are quite similar across specifications.21 
The first four columns in Table 3 (estimated with OLS) examine whether, all else equal, 
homeowners talk more often to their immediate neighbors. While column (1) reports results 
for the base specification with no controls except community fixed effects, column (2) adds 
all other controls except the variables that measure commuting habits and expected length of 
stay as these might be endogenous (see Section 3.3). Column (3) also adds these suspect 
controls. Finally, the specification in column (4) differs from that in column (3) in that it 
limits the sample size only to survey respondents who live in metro areas. The coefficient on 
the individual homeownership status variable in column (1) is quite large and highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Adding further controls (including the demand side 
variables discussed in Section 2.3) in columns (2) to (4) reduces the coefficient on the 
homeownership variable by over half (but the effect remains significant at the 1% level). It is 
worth noting that the change in the size of the coefficient is not at all driven by the inclusion 
of the demand variables. The coefficient on the homeownership variable is appreciably 
unchanged in columns (2) to (4), suggesting that the findings are robust to whether the suspect 
                                                 
21 However, the effects of many controls vary depending on whether neighborhood- or non-neighborhood-
specific measures of social capital are considered (see Table A1). For example, respondents with children are 
more socially interactive at the neighborhood level (where children-specific club goods are more relevant) but 
are significantly less socially interactive at work and in service/fraternity organizations, consistent with the view 
that time constrained households substitute less beneficial forms of social interactions for more beneficial ones. 
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controls and rural observations are included or not. In fact, the coefficient on the individual 
homeownership variable is slightly larger in the MSA-only specification. The effect of 
individual homeownership is economically meaningful. Based on the specification reported in 
column (3), all else equal and measured at the sample-mean, homeowners have about 14 
additional social interactions with immediate neighbors (or: are 13.7% more socially 
interactive) compared to renters (other quantitative effects are reported in Table 7).  
The first four columns provide strong support for the proposition that homeowners are 
more socially interactive. Columns (2) to (4) also indicate that the share developed land 
(positive coefficient) and the population density in the developed area of a tract (negative 
coefficient) are related with opposite signs to the number of social interactions with 
immediate neighbors. Yet, in the 2SLS-estimates reported below the effect of the density 
variable becomes statistically insignificant. Columns (3) and (4) provide support for 
Predictions 2 and 3. Respondents interact with each other after a brief period with not much 
evidence of further interaction as the duration in the neighborhood increases, lending support 
to Explanation 1. Respondents socially interact more if their expected duration in the 
neighborhood is longer, consistent with Explanations 1 and 2. Finally, Table A1 documents 
that the homeownership propensity in the county is not statistically significant. This finding is 
again consistent with Explanation 1 (see Section 3.3) but does not lend support to Explanation 
2 (although it is plausible that the expected effects offset each other and/or only matter at a 
smaller geographical scale). Overall, these results suggest that house price capitalization 
provides a plausible explanation for the stylized facts presented at the outset. The findings are 
also largely consistent with norms of reciprocity. However, the latter explanation cannot 
exclusively explain all empirical findings. 
The specifications in columns (5) to (8) of Table 3 (still estimated with OLS) mirror 
those of the first four columns except that an interaction term own×% developed is added. 
All four specifications provide strong support for Prediction 1: individual homeownership is 
more strongly positively linked to social interactions among immediate neighbors in more 
built-up neighborhoods. The coefficient on the variable own×% developed is positive and 
highly significant at the 1% level in all four cases. Adding controls in column (6) reduces the 
coefficient on the interaction term somewhat (from 0.45 to 0.36) but again this is not driven 
by the addition of the demand variables. (In fact adding the demand controls marginally 
increases the magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction term, consistent with 
expectations.) Adding suspect controls (column 7) or removing rural observations (column 8) 
has a quite limited effect on the size of the coefficient of the interaction term. The effect is 
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reasonably meaningful in economic terms. The move from a neighborhood that is halfway 
developed to one that is 86% developed (plus one standard deviation), adds 4.1 social 
interactions to a homeowner’s tally but reduces the renter’s tally by 2.7 interactions.22  
Interestingly, when adding controls, the independent (positive) effect of the respondent’s 
homeownership status variable on the number of social interactions with neighbors becomes 
completely statistically insignificant. This implies that homeowners are not per se “better 
citizens” but rather that the divergent behavior of homeowners and renters is driven by local 
land scarcity. This is consistent with Explanation 1 as the homeownership status should not 
be relevant in the absence of house price capitalization effects. The finding also appears to be 
consistent with Explanation 2. Although homeownership (or better: the longer expected 
duration associated with homeownership) should facilitate reciprocal cooperation, in a 
neighborhood with many potential newcomers, a reciprocal cooperation-equilibrium may not 
be feasible independent of the respondent’s homeownership status (or the homeownership 
propensity in the area). Note also that the independent effect of the share developed land 
variable now has a negative sign, although the effect is only marginally significant and in one 
case insignificant. The findings also provide further support for Predictions 2 and 3. Overall, 
the findings are again consistent with Explanation 1 and largely, but not entirely, with 
Explanation 2. The findings are not consistent with the outcome of a Tiebout sorting process.  
The endogeneity issues related to the land scarcity and the density variable are addressed 
using a two stage least squares-estimator (2SLS). The results – which provide additional 
support for the above conclusions – are reported in the last four columns of Table 3. Column 
(9) reports results for a specification without any controls, while the remaining three columns 
include all controls. The density variable is considered to be exogenous in column (10) but 
endogenous in columns (11) and (12). The last column reports results for the MSA-only 
sample. The results again provide strong support for Prediction 1. The interaction effect 
own ×% developed remains positive and significant at least at the 2% level in all four 
specifications. The coefficient increases in size; in line with the reasoning in Section 3.3 that 
endogeneity of the land scarcity variable creates a downward bias. However, the effect is also 
more imprecisely measured. The coefficient on the interaction variable is fairly stable across 
specifications and the quantitative effects are meaningful. A one standard deviation increase 
                                                 
22 The negative sign of this effect is due to the negative coefficient on the share developed variable. The 
coefficient is not statistically significant and is used to calculate the effect for homeowners and renters. Hence, 
the gap of 5.9 interactions between the two groups is unchanged if the statistically insignificant effect is ignored. 
The finding of a negative effect for renters is consistent with theory. To the extent that other factors induce 
renters to invest, one would expect that rent adjustments negatively affect the renters’ social capital investments. 
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of the land scarcity variable, measured at the sample mean, increases the difference in the 
number of social interactions between homeowners and renters by +13.1 and +12.8, 
respectively, compared to +6.9 in the OLS estimate reported in column (7). The independent 
effect of the respondent’s homeownership status remains statistically insignificant. 
Two diagnostic statistics are reported for all 2SLS estimates to assess potential weakness 
of instruments. The first-stage F-statistics documented in columns (9) to (12) of Table 3 
either comfortably exceed the critical value or are close to it, indicating that the instruments 
may not be weak. 23  However, strictly speaking, when there are multiple endogenous 
regressors, individually satisfactory F-statistics are not sufficient. To assess whether a given 
group of instruments is weak in this case, Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest using the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic. This statistic, again reported in columns (9) to (12) of Table 3, indicates 
that the group of instruments is not weak in any of the four specifications.24 A number of 
additional diagnostics were carried out including Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-
ratio tests (a test of model identification), Hansen-J statistics (a test of instrument validity). 
All specifications pass these tests. Finally, tests for endogeneity of the endogenous variables 
(Wu-Hausman F and Durbin-Wu-Hausman- 2χ ) cannot reject the hypothesis that treatment 
as an exogenous variable would yield consistent estimates. 
Table 4 reports linear probability estimates for the respondent’s participation in 
neighborhood associations. The dependent variable is 1 if the household participates and 0 
otherwise. Apart from the dependent variable, all specifications are identical to those in Table 
3. Overall, results are very similar qualitatively to those in Table 3. The estimates of the base 
specification reported in columns (1) to (4) all suggest that individual homeownership is 
positively and statistically highly significantly related to participation in neighborhood 
associations. The quantitative effects are economically meaningful. All else equal, the 
probability that a homeowner participates is 11.1% points higher than that of a renter. As 
only 14.2% of all renters in the sample participate, homeowners are almost 80% more likely 
to join a neighborhood club compared to renters.  
The remaining specifications reported in columns (4) to (12) provide strong support for 
Prediction 1. Individual homeownership is more strongly positively linked to participation in 
                                                 
23 The first-stage F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the first stage regression of 
2SLS. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested a rule of thumb that instruments should be deemed weak (and 2SLS 
inference not considered fully reliable) if the first-stage F-statistic of an endogenous regressor is less than ten 
(see also Stock et al., 2002). Stock and Yogo (2005) provide a more precise decision rule. 
24 The hypothesis that the desired maximal bias of the 2SLS-estimator relative to OLS exceeds 0.05 can be 
rejected with 95% confidence in all cases. See Stock and Yogo (2005) for a more in-depth discussion of the test 
and its interpretation as well as for tabulations of critical values. 
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neighborhood associations in more developed locations. Interestingly, in the OLS-
specifications the coefficient on the variable own×% developed increases slightly when the 
controls are added. The coefficient on the interaction term is remarkably stable across the 
four 2SLS-specifications (ranging from 0.18 to 0.22). Again similar to the results reported in 
Table 3, the magnitude of the effect of the interaction term is substantially larger in the 2SLS-
estimates than in the OLS-estimates. The effects are quantitatively very meaningful. 
According to the OLS-specification with controls reported in column (7), a one standard 
deviation increase in the share developed land increases the participation probability-gap 
between homeowners and renters by 3.5% points or, measured at the sample mean, by almost 
14%. According to the corresponding 2SLS-estimates reported in column (11), a one 
standard deviation increase in the share developed land increases the participation probability 
gap by 6.3% points or, again measured at the sample mean, by roughly 25%. It is worth 
nothing that the independent effect of the homeownership status variable in columns (10) to 
(12) – the specifications with most or all controls – is completely statistically insignificant 
providing further support for the proposition that homeownership alone does not generate 
“good citizens” (consistent with Explanations 1 and 2). The results of the instrument 
diagnostics – reported in Table 4 – are very similar compared to those for Table 3. 
 
Second-stage results: Non-neighborhood specific measures of social capital 
Table 5 documents results for the two non-neighborhood specific measures of social 
capital. Panel A of Table 5 reports estimates for the number of social interactions with co-
workers outside work per year. The sample size of 13,491 respondents is notably smaller 
compared to the previous estimates. This is because no data is available for non-working 
respondents. Panel B reports estimates for the likelihood that a respondent participates in a 
service or fraternal organization. The dependent variable is 1 if the respondent participates 
and 0 otherwise. Results are only reported for specifications with the full set of controls, for 
the full sample and the MSA-only sample respectively. (The tables that correspond to Tables 
3 and 4 are available in Appendix Tables A6 and A7.) Again, OLS results are first reported 
for specifications without the interaction term own×% developed, then the interaction term is 
added, finally the full specification is re-estimated using 2SLS. The OLS estimates without 
interaction effects reported in columns (1a) and (2a) suggest that individual homeownership 
is negatively and statistically significantly related to social interactions with co-workers. This 
is consistent with the view that time constrained homeowners substitute less beneficial 
activities (e.g., meeting with co-workers after work) for more beneficial ones (e.g., carrying 
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out home improvements or socially interacting with neighbors). Interestingly, in Panel A the 
variable “expect to stay for at least 5 more years” is positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications except column (5a) where the coefficient is not quite significant at the 10%-
level. This finding is consistent with the reasoning in Section 2.2. and provides support for 
Explanation 2. Also consistent with that reasoning, the expected length of stay variable is 
insignificant in all specifications in Panel B. The interaction effects own×% developed in 
columns (3) to (6) are all completely insignificant, rejecting Prediction 4 and casting serious 
doubt on Explanation 3. In contrast, Table 5 provides additional support for Explanations 1 
and 2 in the sense that the findings do not falsify these explanations. The instrument 
diagnostics documented in Table 5 are similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Results of specifications with endogenous homeownership 
The results so far are based on the somewhat questionable assumption that individual 
homeownership is exogenous. In contrast, Table 6 reports 2SLS estimates that treat the 
individual homeownership variable as endogenous. Results are reported for Specification 2 
and all four measures of social capital. Note in this context that, based on the estimated 
specifications, tests for endogeneity of individual homeownership (with the exception of the 
specification for social interactions with immediate neighbors) cannot reject the hypothesis 
that treatment as an exogenous variable would yield consistent estimates. This suggests that 
any endogeneity of the variable might not have a deleterious effect. In light of the difficulty 
to find valid and strong instruments that identify homeownership (see below) this casts some 
doubt on whether the variable should be treated as endogenous. 
With this caveat in mind, first turn to the specifications for the two neighborhood-
specific measures of social capital reported in columns (1) to (6). Apart from treating 
individual homeownership as endogenous, these specifications are identical to those in 
columns (10) to (12) of Tables 3 and 4. The key variable of interest is again the interaction 
effect own×% developed and, again, the coefficients on this variable are positive and highly 
significant in all cases (at least at the 2%-level). The coefficients on the interaction effects 
(and the corresponding standard errors) are stable across specifications and are about twice as 
large compared to those reported in Tables 3 and 4. Consequently, the implied quantitative 
effects are substantial. The coefficient in column (5) implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the share developed land increases the participation probability gap between 
homeowners and renters by 17.4% points. This is a very meaningful effect given that, on 
average, only roughly 14% of renters and 30% of homeowners participate in neighborhood 
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associations. The finding of a large increase in the coefficients is similar to that in DiPasquale 
and Glaeser (1999) who estimate a specification analogous to the base specification in this 
paper but use an alternative strategy to identify homeownership. They also see their 
coefficients and standard errors increase substantially – likely due to weakness of the 
instrument – and they conclude that their OLS estimates may be more accurate.25  
To assess potential weakness of instruments, Table 6 reports both first-stage F-statistics 
and Cragg-Donald F-statistics. The latter statistics indicate a weak instrument problem in all 
specifications. One way to partially address this issue is to use a JIVE- instead of a 2SLS-
estimator. The JIVE-estimator is designed to eliminate the correlation between the first-stage 
fitted values and structural error-term that causes the 2SLS-estimator to be biased. Angrist et 
al. (1999) show that JIVE-estimators perform much better than 2SLS-estimators in models 
with many weak instruments, that is, they generate much smaller bias. Hence, in an attempt 
to estimate the relevant coefficients with less bias, I re-estimated the specifications in Table 6 
using a JIVE-estimator. The results (reported in Appendix Table A8) are quite similar to 
those in Table 6, both in terms of magnitude of the coefficients and statistical significance. 
Overall, the results suggest that the positive effect of homeownership on individual 
investment in neighborhood specific social capital may be causal and largely confined to 
built-up locations, providing further support for Prediction 1 (and Explanations 1 and 2). A 
few other results are worth noting. The estimates in columns (4) to (6) suggest that residents 
are more likely to participate in neighborhood organizations during the first few years after 
moving in and that participation decreases after 10 years. Moreover, the expected length of 
stay variable is now no longer consistently significant across specifications, although, when 
the specifications are estimated using a JIVE-estimator, the variable is significant at least at 
the 5%-level in all cases.  
Finally, columns (7) to (12) of Table 6 report results for the two non-neighborhood 
specific social capital measures. Again, the results of the various specifications confirm the 
previously reported finding that the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically 
significant for non-neighborhood specific measures of social capital (inconsistent with 
Explanation 3). Cragg-Donald F-statistics again indicate a weak instrument problem and, 
again, re-estimating the specifications using a JIVE-estimator leaves results qualitatively 
unchanged. One other finding is worth noting: the daily commuting time is not significantly 
related to participation in any associations. Yet, the variable is strongly negatively related to 
                                                 
25 I also re-estimated the specifications in Table 6 using DiPasquale and Glaeser’s (1999) identification 
strategy. The alternative instrument yields similar results but test-statistics imply weaker identification.  
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both measures capturing social interaction. Consistent with the proposition that more time-
constraint individuals are less socially interactive, respondents with long commutes have 
significantly fewer social interactions with neighbors and co-workers outside work.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper I present evidence suggesting that the (causal) positive effect of individual 
homeownership on individual investments in neighborhood specific social capital is mainly 
confined to more built-up places. Homeownership alone does not ensure the formation of 
social capital. A number of explanations are explored. Overall, the empirical findings provide 
strong support for the proposition that individual investment in social capital is facilitated by 
house price induced incentives. In built-up localities the social capital induced entry of 
newcomers increases house values more strongly, discouraging others from entering and 
thereby preventing (further) dilution of social capital. Hence, house price capitalization 
ensures that immobile homeowners – in contrast to renters – can internalize the benefits of 
their investments. In a similar vein, the social capital induced house price premium ensures 
that individuals only enter a neighborhood when they have a desire to engage (immediately) 
in the neighborhood’s social network(s), ensuring the provision of social capital induced club 
goods in the longer run. In contrast, in less developed neighborhoods there appear to be few 
(additional) incentives for homeowners to invest in social capital. 
The evidence is also largely consistent with the proposition that social interactions at the 
neighborhood level are driven by benefits arising from reciprocal cooperation. Inelastic 
housing supply may help sustain a reciprocal cooperation equilibrium. However, the 
reciprocal cooperation-mechanism alone cannot explain all findings. Finally, the proposition 
that the stylized facts presented at the outset are driven by selection based on inherent 
differences in social aptitudes or by Tiebout sorting can largely be discounted. 
In a broader context, the findings imply that house price capitalization (and possibly 
reciprocal cooperation) may only provide a compelling mechanism for homeowners to make 
long-term investments in their neighborhoods and local communities (i.e., to take into account 
the preferences of future homebuyers and possibly future generations) if housing transaction 
costs are sufficiently high and potential new housing supply limited. Therefore, differences in 
local housing market conditions may provide an additional explanation – besides sorting and 
peer effects – why suburban locations in highly urbanized areas (i.e., locations with high 
homeownership rates and little developable land) not only tend to have better local public 
services (such as local public schools) but also greater accumulation of social capital. 
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Summary Statistics and Regression Tables 
 
TABLE 1: Variable list and descriptive statistics  
 
(N=20,505 unless otherwise noted) 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Social capital measures     
Number of social interactions (i.e., talk or visit) with 
immediate neighbors 114.0 112.4 0 312 
Respondent participates in neighborhood association 
(N=20,424) 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Number of times socialized with co-workers outside 
work (only workers) (N=13,491) 13.5 17.5 0 60 
Respondent participates in service or fraternal 
organization 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Respondent specific measures     
Respondent is homeowner 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Number of years lived in local community  
(omitted category: Less than one year)     
 One to five years 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 Six to ten years 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 Eleven to twenty years 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 More than twenty years 0.27 0.44 0 1 
 All life 0.084 0.28 0 1 
Expect to stay in community for at least 5 more yrs. 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Respondent is daily commuter 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Daily commuting time in hours (no commute = 0) 0.28 0.41 0 4.92 
Daily commuting time (only workers, N=13,491) 0.43 0.43 0.020 4.92 
Race (omitted: White)     
 Black  0.11 0.32 0 1 
 Asian 0.016 0.13 0 1 
 Hispanic 0.067 0.25 0 1 
 Other non-White 0.055 0.23 0 1 
Respondent is male 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Age of respondent 44.3 16.1 18 99 
Respondent has children  0.40 0.49 0 1 
Total household income, 1999 (omitted: Below $30,000)     
 Between $30,000 and $49,999 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 Between $50,000 and $74, 999 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 Between $75,000 and $99, 999 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 Over $100,000 0.12 0.32 0 1 
 Over $30,000 unspecified 0.040 0.20 0 1 
Marital status (omitted: Currently married)     
 Marital status: Never married 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 Marital status: Widowed 0.070 0.26 0 1 
 Marital status: Divorced 0.13 0.34 0 1 
 Marital status: Separated 0.030 0.17 0 1 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Highest education completed  
(omitted: Less than high school) 
    
 High school diploma 0.24 0.43 0 1 
 Some college 0.22 0.41 0 1 
 Assoc. degree (2 y.) or specialized 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 Bachelor’s degree 0.18 0.38 0 1 
 Some graduate training 0.036 0.19 0 1 
 Graduate or professional degree 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Current employment status (omitted: Working)     
 Temporarily laid off 0.016 0.13 0 1 
 Unemployed 0.023 0.15 0 1 
 Retired 0.15 0.35 0 1 
 Permanently disabled 0.032 0.18 0 1 
 Homemaker 0.065 0.25 0 1 
 Student 0.032 0.18 0 1 
Census tract specific variables (from NLCD 1992)     
% Developed land in Census tract, 1992 0.52 0.36 0.000092 1 
 Only respondents in center city (N=10,749) 0.68 0.30 0.0005854 1 
 Only respondents outside MSA (N=2,480) 0.12 0.21 0.000092 0.98 
Population density in developed area (in person per m2) 0.0031 0.0033 0.0000016 0.20 
Census county level controls (from Census 2000, matched to 1990 boundaries) 
Homeownership rate  0.65 0.10 0.20 0.88 
Gini-coefficient of income distribution 0.41 0.026 0.30 0.48 
Linguistic heterogeneity 0.27 0.15 0.050 0.68 
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.33 0.19 0.0090 0.70 
% Units in single-family detached homes 0.59 0.12 0.0029 0.90 
% Units in multi-unit buildings 0.29 0.14 0.030 0.99 
Proxy measures for availability of area-specific amenities 
Arrests for murder in county per 100,000 residents  5.6 7.4 0 60.0 
Population size of place to which tract belongs 258787 515920 496 8008278 
Average household income in county 56069 10565 31128 92406 
Excluded instruments     
Share wetlands in Census tract 0.016 0.038 0 0.62 
County topography (omitted: plains with mountains, open 
hills & mountains, hills & mount.) 
    
 Flat plains 0.073 0.26 0 1 
 Smooth plains 0.048 0.21 0 1 
 Irregular plains 0.30 0.46 0 1 
 Tablelands, moderate relief 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 Plains with hills 0.057 0.23 0 1 
 High mountains 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Population density in county to which tract belongs 0.0025 0.0014 0.00031 0.048 
Population density in corresponding MSA (N=18,028) 0.0019 0.00062 0.0010 0.0080 
Total maximum mortgage subsidy rate by state  
(federal plus state) 
0.42 0.023 0.45 0.40 
Notes: Summary statistics are reported for the regression sample used in Table 4 unless otherwise noted. The descriptive 
statistics for all other regression samples are very similar to the ones reported in this table. 
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TABLE 2: First-stage regressions: Full sample 
 
 Dependent Variables (Endogenous variables in 2nd stage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Share Developed 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) Own 
Excluded Instruments       
Share wetlands in Census tract -1.77 ** -1.77 ** -0.37 -1.79 ** -0.38 0.20 (*) 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.47) (0.37) (0.47) (0.20) 
Topography: flat plains 0.076 (*) 0.086 * -0.046 0.091 * -0.043 -0.010 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.047) (0.041) (0.047) (0.029) 
Topography: smooth plains 0.10 ** 0.098 ** -0.12 * 0.095 ** -0.12 * 0.018 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.050) (0.035) (0.050) (0.028) 
Topography: irregular plains 0.069 * 0.070 ** -0.010 0.070 ** -0.0094 0.0056 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.013) 
0.079 ** 0.089 ** 0.039 0.10 ** 0.050 -0.0082 Topography: tablelands, moderate 
relief (0.028) (0.026) (0.038) (0.025) (0.039) (0.029) 
0.11 ** 0.10 ** 0.030 0.10 ** 0.029 -0.0040 Topography: plains with hills 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.045) (0.032) (0.045) (0.017) 
 -0.13 ** 0.97 ** -0.13 ** 0.96 ** -0.0036 Log (population density in developed 
area of county)  (0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.036) (0.022) 
 0.0042 0.19 ** 0.011 0.19 ** -0.017 Topography: high mountains 
 (0.060) (0.068) (0.063) (0.068) (0.035) 
   2.98 * 2.53 1.86 * Total mortgage subsidy rate (2000) ×  
dummy (HH income < $20,000)    (1.32) (1.73) (0.87) 
   2.94 * 2.45 2.14 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($20,000 - $30,000)    (1.32) (1.73) (0.87) 
   2.93 * 2.52 2.19 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy (< $30,000, unspecified)    (1.32) (1.72) (0.88) 
   3.10 * 2.89 (*) 2.10 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($30,000 - $50,000)    (1.31) (1.71) (0.80) 
   2.89 * 2.89 (*) 1.34 Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($50,000 - $75,000)    (1.32) (1.72) (0.82) 
   2.57 (*) 3.18 (*) 2.13 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($75,000 - $100,000)    (1.35) (1.76) (0.83) 
   3.46 * 2.76 2.34 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy (> $100,000)    (1.34) (1.79) (0.99) 
   3.09 * 4.90 ** 2.10 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy (> $30,000, unspecified)    (1.41) (1.88) (1.01) 
Included Instruments       
-0.024      Log (population density in developed 
area of tract) (0.020)      
Respondent is homeowner -0.059 ** -0.059 ** -0.025 (*)    
 (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.015)    
0.0090 0.0076 0.035 (*) 0.00055 0.032 (*) 0.11 ** Lived in local community 
1-5 years (omitted: less than 1 y.) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.018) (0.0070) (0.018) (0.014) 
0.016 * 0.014 * 0.032 0.0023 0.027 0.20 ** Lived in local community 
6-10 years (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.019) (0.0066) (0.019) (0.014) 
0.034 ** 0.032 ** 0.035 * 0.017 * 0.030 (*) 0.27 ** Lived in local community 
11-20 years (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.018) (0.0069) (0.017) (0.018) 
0.039 ** 0.037 ** 0.016 0.020 ** 0.0094 0.29 ** Lived in local community 
more than 20 years (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.019) (0.0071) (0.018) (0.019) 
0.044 ** 0.042 ** 0.0071 0.027 * 0.0015 0.27 ** Lived in local community 
all life (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) 
 (Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
 Dependent Variables (Endogenous variables in 2nd stage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Share Developed 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) Own 
-0.012 ** -0.012 ** -0.013 -0.021 ** -0.017 (*) 0.15 ** Expect to stay in community for at 
least 5 more years (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0090) (0.0044) (0.009) (0.010) 
Respondent is commuting 0.020 ** 0.020 ** -0.0024 0.020 ** -0.0027 -0.0045 
 (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.016) (0.0067) (0.016) (0.013) 
-0.031 ** -0.031 ** 0.047 ** -0.032 ** 0.047 ** 0.0076 Daily commuting time in hours  
(no commute = 0) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.014) (0.0053) (0.014) (0.0086) 
0.59 (*) 0.48 2.05 ** 0.41 2.00 ** 0.50 * Homeownership rate in county 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.41) (0.30) (0.39) (0.21) 
0.81 0.27 0.55 0.29 0.57 0.13 Gini-coefficient of income 
distribution in county (0.66) (0.66) (0.54) (0.64) (0.53) (0.36) 
0.14 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.18 -0.061 Linguistic heterogeneity in county 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.15) (0.20) (0.14) 
0.075 0.032 0.027 0.072 0.072 0.13 Ethnic heterogeneity in county 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.086) 
0.36 * 0.14 0.043 0.14 0.032 -0.11 Share of units that are single-family 
detached homes in county (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.19) (0.26) (0.17) 
1.21 ** 1.18 ** 0.33 1.09 ** 0.25 -0.13 Share of units that are in multi-unit 
buildings in county (0.29) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.34) (0.18) 
0.0015 0.0019 -0.0033 ** 0.0016 -0.0036 ** 0.00055 Arrests for murder in county  
per 100,000 residents (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.00065) 
0.049 ** 0.047 ** 0.097 ** 0.048 ** 0.097 ** -0.0080 ** Log(population size of place to 
which tract belongs) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.013) (0.0063) (0.013) (0.0024) 
0.0013 0.0018 -0.011 ** 0.0017 -0.011 ** -0.00022 Average household income in county 
in 1,000$ (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.00017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0011) 
Demographic controls: race, sex, 
age, age2, marital status, children 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Socioeconomic controls (dummies): 
income, education, employment 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.45 ** -1.66 ** -2.41 ** -2.90 ** -3.45 ** -1.17 * 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.51) (0.61) (0.86) (0.49) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.48 0.56 0.48 0.34 
Notes: Sample size based on specifications reported in Table 4. N=20,505. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered 
by Census counties (cluster size=393).  ** Significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; (*) significant at 10%. Bold coefficients are 
excluded instruments used to specifically identify the (endogenous) dependent variables. 
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TABLE 3: Estimates of the determinants of social interactions with neighbors 
 
 OLS, no interaction: own ×% developed OLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 2SLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) MSA (5) (6) (7) (8) MSA (9) (10) (11) (12) MSA 
0.65 ** 0.29 ** 0.25 ** 0.28 ** 0.37 ** 0.072 0.050 0.077 0.051 -0.18 -0.18 -0.27 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.082) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) 
    0.45 ** 0.36 ** 0.34 ** 0.31 ** 0.96 ** 0.72 ** 0.71 ** 0.85 * Own ×  share developed 
    (0.093) (0.086) (0.086) (0.097) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.35) 
-0.0046 0.095 * 0.095 * 0.097 * -0.34 ** -0.18 * -0.16 (*) -0.135 -0.86 ** -0.56 * -0.56 * -0.59 (*) Share developed 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.087) (0.083) (0.084) (0.092) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28) (0.34) 
 -0.051 * -0.046 * -0.024  -0.039 (*) -0.035 (*) -0.014  -0.025 -0.071 0.12 Log (pop. density in 
developed area)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.062) (0.11) 
 0.41 ** 0.40 ** 0.33 **  0.41 ** 0.40 ** 0.335 **  0.41 ** 0.41 ** 0.34 ** Lived in community 
1-5 years   (0.060) (0.060) (0.056)  (0.060) (0.060) (0.056)  (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) 
 0.54 ** 0.51 ** 0.46 **  0.55 ** 0.51 ** 0.463 **  0.52 ** 0.52 ** 0.47 ** Lived in community 
6-10 years  (0.067) (0.067) (0.062)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.063)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
 0.54 ** 0.50 ** 0.44 **  0.54 ** 0.50 ** 0.439 **  0.51 ** 0.51 ** 0.44 ** Lived in community 
11-20 years  (0.066) (0.067) (0.062)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.062)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.063) 
 0.51 ** 0.47 ** 0.42 **  0.51 ** 0.47 ** 0.423 **  0.47 ** 0.47 ** 0.43 ** Lived in community 
more than 20 years  (0.062) (0.063) (0.064)  (0.062) (0.063) (0.064)  (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
 0.52 ** 0.48 ** 0.42 **  0.53 ** 0.48 ** 0.419 **  0.49 ** 0.49 ** 0.43 ** Lived in community 
all life  (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)  (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
  0.23 ** 0.24 **   0.23 ** 0.239 **  0.22 ** 0.22 ** 0.24 ** Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years   (0.035) (0.037)   (0.035) (0.037)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) 
  -0.10 ** -0.082 *   -0.098 ** -0.079 *  -0.098 * -0.096 * -0.081 (*) Daily commuting time 
  (0.038) (0.040)   (0.038) (0.040)  (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls a) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3.51 ** 1.50 1.56 2.13 (*) 3.73 ** 1.64 (*) 1.69 (*) 2.285 (*) 4.11 ** 1.68 (*) 1.46 3.24 (*) Constant 
(0.071) (0.97) (0.96) (1.27) (0.089) (0.98) (0.97) (1.288) (0.19) (0.95) (1.03) (1.80) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036 0.078 0.081 0.087 0.037 0.079 0.082 0.087     
F:  Share developed         17.1 8.5 8.5 11.4 
 Own ×  share developed         22.7 18.2 17.6 21.0 
 Log (pop. dens.)           83.9 45.9 
Cragg-Donald F-stat         198.5 99.5 84.2 55.4 
Notes: Dependent variable in log-form. N=20,424 (full sample) and 17,963 (MSA only). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties (cluster size=391/230).  ** / * 
/ (*) Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Excluded instruments are documented in Table 2. All specifications reported in columns (9) to (12) comfortably pass the 
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio-test and the Hansen J-overidentification test. a) Appendix Table A1 reports the full set of coefficients for specification (11). 
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TABLE 4: Estimates of the determinants of participation in neighborhood associations 
 
 OLS, no interaction: own ×% developed OLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 2SLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) MSA (5) (6) (7) (8) MSA (9) (10) (11) (12) MSA 
0.18 ** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.057 ** 0.054 ** 0.071 ** 0.076 (*) 0.0049 0.0065 -0.023 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.063) 
    0.096 ** 0.098 ** 0.096 ** 0.071 * 0.20 * 0.18 * 0.18 * 0.22 * Own ×  share developed 
    (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.078) (0.081) (0.081) (0.10) 
0.074 ** 0.021 0.022 0.029 (*) 0.0024 -0.053 * -0.050 * -0.025 0.045 -0.098 -0.095 -0.090 Share developed 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.050) (0.067) (0.064) (0.074) 
 0.0088 0.0090 0.0062  0.012 0.012 0.0087  0.015 -0.010 0.0045 Log (pop. density in 
developed area)  (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0081)  (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0081)  (0.0092) (0.022) (0.035) 
 0.043 ** 0.042 ** 0.038 **  0.044 ** 0.043 ** 0.040 **  0.044 ** 0.044 ** 0.042 ** Lived in community 
1-5 years   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
 0.064 ** 0.060 ** 0.054 **  0.065 ** 0.061 ** 0.056 **  0.061 ** 0.062 ** 0.058 ** Lived in community 
6-10 years  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
 0.039 ** 0.035 ** 0.033 **  0.039 ** 0.035 ** 0.033 **  0.035 ** 0.036 ** 0.033 ** Lived in community 
11-20 years  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
 0.026 * 0.021 0.022  0.026 * 0.021 (*) 0.023  0.021 (*) 0.021 (*) 0.022 Lived in community 
more than 20 years  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
 0.012 0.0058 0.0070  0.012 0.0063 0.0077  0.0060 0.0059 0.0068 Lived in community 
all life  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
  0.031 ** 0.028 **   0.030 ** 0.027 **  0.029 ** 0.029 ** 0.027 ** Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years   (0.0058) (0.0062)   (0.0059) (0.0063)  (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0065) 
  0.0043 -0.00053   0.0052 0.000011  0.0064 0.0078 0.0032 Daily commuting time 
  (0.0076) (0.0079)   (0.0075) (0.0079)  (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0080) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls a) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0.19 ** -0.70 (*) -0.69 (*) -0.41 0.24 ** -0.67 (*) -0.65 (*) -0.37 0.17 ** -0.60 -0.72 (*) -0.28 Constant 
(0.044) (0.37) (0.37) (0.43) (0.049) (0.37) (0.37) (0.43) (0.060) (0.42) (0.42) (0.50) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.062 0.10 0.11 0.11     
F:  Share developed         17.1 8.4 8.5 11.3 
 Own× share developed         22.5 18.0 17.3 20.7 
 Log (pop. dens.)           84.9 46.3 
Cragg-Donald F-stat         199.3 100.0 84.4 55.7 
Notes: N=20,505 (full sample) and 18,028 (MSA only). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties (cluster size=393/230).  **/ */ (*) Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
Bold coefficients are instrumented. Excluded instruments are documented in Table 2. All specifications reported in columns (9) to (12) comfortably pass the Anderson canonical correlations 
likelihood-ratio-test and the Hansen J-overidentification test. a) Appendix Table A1 reports the full set of coefficients for specification (11). 
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TABLE 5: Estimates of the determinants of measures of non-neighborhood specific social capital 
 
 Panel A: Social interactions with co-workers outside work Panel B: Participation in service or fraternal organizations 
 OLS, no interaction OLS, with interaction 2SLS, with interaction OLS, no interaction OLS, with interaction 2SLS, with interaction 
 (1a) (2a) MSA (3a) (4a) MSA (5a) (6a) MSA (1b) (2b) MSA (3b) (4b) MSA (5b) (6b) MSA 
-0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.099 (*) -0.078 -0.21 (*) -0.20 0.00045 -0.0018 0.011 0.0017 -0.019 -0.042 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.051) (0.062) (0.12) (0.18) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.033) 
  -0.059 -0.089 0.13 0.11   -0.017 -0.0055 0.034 0.061 Own ×  share developed 
  (0.060) (0.071) (0.18) (0.26)   (0.014) (0.016) (0.036) (0.048) 
-0.042 -0.031 0.0014 0.035 -0.22 -0.24 -0.0028 0.00026 0.010 0.0042 -0.027 -0.058 Share developed 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.059) (0.070) (0.20) (0.26) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.048) (0.051) 
0.037 (*) 0.027 0.035 0.024 0.21 ** 0.23 * -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.018 ** -0.019 ** -0.012 -0.010 Log (pop. density in 
developed area) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.067) (0.11) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.018) (0.028) 
0.011 -0.0085 0.010 -0.010 0.0093 -0.011 -0.00028 0.0041 -0.00051 0.0040 0.000044 0.0050 Lived in community 
1-5 years  (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.11 * 0.11 * 0.0087 0.0085 0.0085 0.0084 0.0090 0.010 Lived in community 
6-10 years (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.078 * 0.066 (*) 0.078 * 0.066 (*) 0.079 * 0.069 (*) 0.019 (*) 0.020 (*) 0.019 (*) 0.020 (*) 0.019 (*) 0.021 (*) Lived in community 
11-20 years (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
0.10 ** 0.086 * 0.10 ** 0.085 * 0.11 ** 0.092 * 0.035 ** 0.038 ** 0.035 ** 0.038 ** 0.035 ** 0.039 ** Lived in community 
more than 20 years (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.11 * 0.091 (*) 0.11 * 0.091 (*) 0.12 * 0.10 * 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.032 ** Lived in community 
all life (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
0.044 (*) 0.055 * 0.045 (*) 0.055 * 0.043 0.056 * -0.000071 0.00073 0.00012 0.00077 -0.00038 0.00023 Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0071) 
-0.080 ** -0.078 ** -0.080 ** -0.079 ** -0.090 ** -0.089 ** 0.0048 0.0077 0.0046 0.0076 0.0049 0.0074 Daily commuting time 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0059) 
Controls a) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2.33 * 1.90 2.30 * 1.85 3.10 ** 3.12 * 0.069 0.083 0.062 0.080 0.10 0.14 Constant 
(0.95) (1.28) (0.95) (1.28) (0.92) (1.33) (0.23) (0.29) (0.23) (0.29) (0.25) (0.35) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12   0.053 0.055 0.053 0.055   
F:  Share developed     6.9 9.4     8.5 11.3 
 Own× share developed     13.1 16.2     17.3 20.7 
 Log (pop. dens.)     70.3 46.4     84.9 46.3 
Cragg-Donald F-stat     55.6 39.4     84.4 55.7 
Notes: Panel A: Dependent variable in log-form. N=13,491 (full sample) and 12,021 (MSA only). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties (cluster size= 
333/203).  Panel B: N=20,505 (full sample) and 18,031 (MSA only). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties (cluster size=393/230). General notes: **/ */ (*) 
Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Excluded instruments are documented in Table 2. All specifications reported in columns (5) and (6) comfortably pass the 
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio-test and the Hansen J-overidentification test. a) Appendix Table A1 reports the full set of coefficients for the respective columns (5). 
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 TABLE 6: 2SLS-Estimates with endogenous homeownership variable 
 
 Log (# Social Interactions w. Neighbors) Participation in Neighborhood Groups Log (# Social Inter. with Co-Workers) Participation in Fraternal/Service Ass. 
 (1) (2) (3) MSA (4) (5) (6) MSA (7) (8) (9) MSA (10) (11) (12) MSA 
-1.62 * -1.51 * -1.44 * -0.15 -0.18 -0.23 (*) 0.12 0.035 -0.21 -0.028 -0.030 -0.045 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.67) (0.66) (0.65) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.48) (0.48) (0.57) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
1.86 ** 1.71 ** 1.89 ** 0.48 * 0.51 ** 0.61 ** 0.17 0.33 0.56 0.18 0.18 0.16 Own ×  share developed 
(0.62) (0.60) (0.63) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.50) (0.50) (0.58) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
-1.62 ** -1.49 ** -1.50 ** -0.31 * -0.33 * -0.38 ** -0.12 -0.29 -0.45 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 Share developed 
(0.53) (0.51) (0.55) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.41) (0.41) (0.50) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
-0.0049 -0.067 0.13 0.025 * -0.0022 0.023 0.052 (*) 0.20 ** 0.24 * -0.011 (*) -0.0095 0.00093 Log (pop. density in 
developed area) (0.028) (0.066) (0.11) (0.011) (0.021) (0.034) (0.027) (0.065) (0.10) (0.0058) (0.018) (0.027) 
0.51 ** 0.51 ** 0.41 ** 0.045 ** 0.048 ** 0.043 ** -0.028 -0.029 -0.037 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.00057 Lived in community 
1-5 years  (0.063) (0.064) (0.060) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
0.69 ** 0.68 ** 0.59 ** 0.059 ** 0.064 ** 0.055 ** 0.031 0.031 0.053 -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0014 Lived in community 
6-10 years (0.094) (0.094) (0.087) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.071) (0.072) (0.079) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
0.72 ** 0.72 ** 0.60 ** 0.029 0.034 0.025 -0.017 -0.019 -0.0087 -0.00094 -0.00085 0.0042 Lived in community 
11-20 years (0.10) (0.10) (0.096) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.086) (0.087) (0.097) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
0.71 ** 0.70 ** 0.60 ** 0.014 0.018 0.012 0.0061 0.0088 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.021 Lived in community 
more than 20 years (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.084) (0.085) (0.095) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
0.70 ** 0.69 ** 0.58 ** -0.00026 0.0038 -0.0020 0.017 0.021 0.023 0.011 0.011 0.016 Lived in community 
all life (0.10) (0.10) (0.095) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.085) (0.086) (0.096) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.32 ** 0.32 ** 0.30 ** 0.022 0.024 (*) 0.017 -0.014 -0.015 0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.0094 Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.049) (0.048) (0.051) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
-0.087 * -0.085 * -0.073 (*) 0.0094 0.011 0.0058 -0.081 ** -0.089 ** -0.083 ** 0.0058 0.0059 0.0080 Daily commuting time 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0061) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1.56 1.26 3.32 (*) -0.46 -0.58 -0.038 2.56 * 3.26 ** 3.59 * 0.17 0.181 0.27 Constant 
(1.04) (1.12) (1.81) (0.43) (0.41) (0.49) (1.04) (0.97) (1.40) (0.24) (0.258) (0.36) 
Observations 20424 20424 17963 20505 20505 18028 13491 13491 12021 20505 20505 18031 
F:  Share developed 13.5 15.4 31.2 13.7 15.4 32.9 15.6 22.3 57.8 13.8 15.5 32.9 
  Own ×  developed 18.9 17.8 26.2 20.1 19.0 25.7 39.4 46.9 54.7 20.2 19.1 25.8 
 Own 23.0 22.5 63.1 21.8 21.3 62.2 33.1 31.9 75.7 21.8 21.3 62.0 
 Log (pop. dens.)  31.7 38.3  32.2 38.2  41.4 42.2  32.1 38.1 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.6 2.5 2.8 
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties.  **/ */ (*) Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Bold coefficients are instrumented. The sets of instruments used to identify 
the endogenous variables are documented in Table 2. All specifications comfortably pass the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio-test and the Hansen J-overidentification test. 
 TABLE 7: Quantitative effects 
 
 Specification Renter Owner ∆ Own  versus Rent 
Change in # of Social Interactions 
with Immediate Neighbors    
Additional # of
Interactions 
Table 3 (3)  Baseline  13.6  13.6 Effect of homeownership status on 
number of social interactions 
 Table 3 (7)  Baseline 
 12.4  a) 
 2.8 b) 
 12.4 a) 
 2.8 b) 
Table 3 (7)  -2.7  4.1  +6.9 
Table 3 (10)  -9.4  3.7  +13.1 
Table 3 (11)  -9.4  3.4  +12.8 
Table 6 (1)  -46.2  5.1  +51.3 
Interaction effect: % Developed land 
increases by 1 std. dev. (+36.0%) 
 
Table 6 (2)  -42.1  4.5  +46.6 
Change in Prob. that Respondent 
Participates in Neigh. Association    
Add. Change in 
Probability 
Table 4 (3)  Baseline  11.1% points  11.1% points Effect of homeownership status on 
probability of participation in 
neighborhood associations 
 
Table 4 (7)  Baseline 
 10.4% points a) 
 5.4% points b) 
 10.4% points a) 
 5.4% points  b)
Table 4 (7)  -1.8% points  1.7% points  +3.5% points 
Table 4 (10)  -3.5% points  2.9% points  +6.5% points 
Table 4 (11)  -3.4% points  2.9% points  +6.3% points 
Table 6 (4) -11.1% points  6.3% points +17.4% points 
% Developed land increases  
by 1 std. dev. (+36.0%) 
 
 
Table 6 (5) -11.8% points  6.7% points +18.5% points 
Notes: All effects are measured at the sample mean of each variable. The probability of participation in neighborhood 
associations at the sample mean is 25.3%. The average participation probability of renters is much lower than that of 
homeowners: 14.2% versus 30.2%. The number of social interactions with immediate neighbors at the sample mean is 
114.0. Homeowners (renters) have on average 119.2 (102.1) social interactions. Quantitative effects are computed using 
all coefficients independent of statistical significance levels. a) Effects are total effects including both independent effects 
and interaction effects. b) Effects are based on independent effects of homeownership only. 
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TABLE A1: Base specifications (OLS) with full set of controls 
 
 Table 3 (3) 
Interaction w. 
neighbors 
 Table 4 (3) 
Participation in 
neighborhood org. 
Table 5 (3) 
Interaction w.  
co-workers 
Table 6 (3) 
Participation in 
service/frat. org.
Reported (key)  variables:     
0.25 ** 0.11 ** -0.13 ** 0.00045 Respondent is homeowner (0.040) (0.012) (0.027) (0.0062) 
0.095 * 0.022 -0.042 -0.0028 % Developed land in Census tract, 1992 (0.044) (0.016) (0.034) (0.011) 
-0.046 * 0.0090 0.037 (*) -0.018 ** Log (population density in developed area  
of Census tract) (0.022) (0.0079) (0.022) (0.0047) 
Number of years lived in local community:  
 Less than one year Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.40 ** 0.042 ** 0.011 -0.00028  1-5 years (0.060) (0.010) (0.041) (0.010) 
0.51 ** 0.060 ** 0.10 * 0.0087  6-10 years (0.067) (0.012) (0.044) (0.010) 
0.50 ** 0.035 ** 0.078 * 0.019 (*)  11-20 years (0.067) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011) 
0.47 ** 0.021 0.10 ** 0.035 **  More than 20 years (0.063) (0.013) (0.037) (0.011) 
0.48 ** 0.0058 0.11 * 0.031 **  All life (0.065) (0.013) (0.049) (0.011) 
0.23 ** 0.031 ** 0.044 (*) -0.000071 Expect to stay in community for at least 5 
more years (0.035) (0.0058) (0.026) (0.0066) 
-0.0055 -0.019  -0.0023 Respondent is commuting (0.049) (0.013)  (0.012) 
-0.10 ** 0.0043 -0.080 ** 0.0048 Daily commuting time in hours  
(no commute = 0) (0.038) (0.0076) (0.026) (0.0057) 
County level and demand controls:     
-0.21 0.45 0.44 0.098 Homeownership rate (0.75) (0.29) (0.70) (0.17) 
0.31 -0.64 0.085 -0.29 Gini-coefficient of income distribution (1.21) (0.46) (1.16) (0.30) 
0.15 -0.088 -0.94 * -0.013 Linguistic heterogeneity (0.44) (0.17) (0.42) (0.087) 
-0.11 0.16 (*) 0.35 0.073 Ethnic heterogeneity (0.24) (0.091) (0.24) (0.053) 
1.16 * 0.037 0.23 0.12 Share of housing units that are single-family 
detached homes (0.51) (0.14) (0.42) (0.099) 
0.88 0.55 ** 0.59 0.099 Share of housing units that are in multi-unit 
buildings (0.68) (0.21) (0.55) (0.16) 
-0.0050 * 0.0013 * -0.0024 -0.00021 Arrest for murder per 100,000 residents in 
county of residence (0.0020) (0.00064) (0.0018) (0.00046) 
0.010 0.013 ** 0.0049 -0.0035 Log (population size of place to which  
resident belongs) (0.011) (0.0033) (0.010) (0.0027) 
-0.0035 0.0030 ** -0.0039 -0.0017 * Average household income in county  
in 1,000$ (0.0031) (0.00097) (0.0029) (0.00079) 
Other survey respondent specific controls:     
Race: 
 White Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.38 ** 0.066 ** -0.29 ** 0.039 **  Black  (0.048) (0.015) (0.039) (0.0086) 
-0.43 ** -0.017 -0.33 ** -0.017  Asian  (0.11) (0.020) (0.065) (0.018) 
-0.59 ** -0.026 (*) -0.27 ** 0.018 (*)  Hispanic (0.081) (0.014) (0.064) (0.011) 
-0.035 0.0093 0.028 -0.0013  Any other non-white (0.077) (0.018) (0.060) (0.011) 
0.072 ** -0.0027 0.13 ** -0.012 * Respondent is male (0.026) (0.0059) (0.022) (0.005) 
(Continued on next page) 
 TABLE A1 (Continued) 
 
 Interaction with 
neighbors 
Participation in 
neighborhood org. 
Interaction w.  
co-workers 
Participation in 
service/frat. org.
0.0040 0.0084 ** -0.036 ** -0.0055 ** Age of respondent (0.0059) (0.0016) (0.0058) (0.00099) 
0.000025 -0.000059 ** 0.00015 * 0.000067 ** Age of respondent squared (in ‘000) (0.000061) (0.000016) (0.000069) (0.000011) 
0.22 ** 0.022 ** -0.13 ** -0.027 ** Respondent has children (0.032) (0.0066) (0.021) (0.0059) 
Total household income:  
 Below $30,000 Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.083 * 0.022 * 0.24 ** 0.024 **  $30,000-49,999 (0.032) (0.0092) (0.036) (0.0074) 
0.084 * 0.027 ** 0.34 ** 0.042 **  $50,000-74,999 (0.043) (0.010) (0.040) (0.0083) 
0.13 ** 0.065 ** 0.44 ** 0.061 **  $75,000-99,999 (0.041) (0.012) (0.045) (0.010) 
0.13 ** 0.11 ** 0.54 ** 0.082 **  Over $100,000 (0.048) (0.015) (0.052) (0.012) 
0.10 (*) 0.060 ** 0.37 ** 0.057 **  Over $30,000 unspecified (0.057) (0.017) (0.059) (0.016) 
Marital status: 
Currently married Reference Reference Reference Reference 
-0.17 ** -0.0057 0.20 ** 0.0023  Never married (0.038) (0.0088) (0.031) (0.0067) 
0.11 (*) -0.016 0.33 ** 0.0034  Widowed (0.057) (0.016) (0.080) (0.012) 
-0.064 (*) 0.010 0.33 ** 0.016 *  Marital status: Divorced (0.035) (0.0086) (0.033) (0.0072) 
-0.33 ** -0.010 0.15 * 0.036 *  Marital status: Separated (0.071) (0.016) (0.065) (0.014) 
Highest education completed: 
 Less than high school Reference Reference Reference Reference 
0.21 ** 0.022 * 0.25 ** 0.020 *  High school diploma (0.066) (0.0094) (0.068) (0.0083) 
0.29 ** 0.066 ** 0.39 ** 0.067 **  Some college (0.066) (0.011) (0.067) (0.010) 
0.32 ** 0.080 ** 0.38 ** 0.071 **  Associate degree (2 y.) or specialized (0.075) (0.015) (0.073) (0.012) 
0.32 ** 0.12 ** 0.44 ** 0.13 **  Bachelor’s degree (0.067) (0.015) (0.069) (0.012) 
0.33 ** 0.091 ** 0.45 ** 0.17 **  Some graduate training (0.10) (0.020) (0.084) (0.017) 
0.25 ** 0.12 ** 0.48 ** 0.15 **  Graduate or professional degree (0.074) (0.013) (0.068) (0.015) 
Current employment status:  
 Working Reference Reference  Reference 
-0.17 (*) 0.0056  -0.041 *  Temporarily laid off (0.095) (0.026)  (0.019) 
-0.054 -0.053 **  -0.012  Unemployed (0.095) (0.020)  (0.017) 
0.20 ** 0.013  0.010  Retired (0.067) (0.019)  (0.017) 
0.13 (*) -0.00039  0.0087  Permanently disabled (0.076) (0.022)  (0.019) 
0.097 -0.00091 -0.76 ** -0.013  Homemaker (0.067) (0.017) (0.14) (0.014) 
-0.16 * 0.0041 0.017 0.097 **  Student (0.081) (0.017) (0.086) (0.018) 
Community sample fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1.56 -0.69 (*) 2.33 * 0.069 Constant (0.96) (0.37) (0.95) (0.23) 
Number of observations 20,424 20,505 13,491 20,505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.10 0.11 0.053 
1 
TABLE A2: SCCBS communities included in regression sample 
 
Community Total Sample Size In % 
Regression 
Sample Size In % 
Atlanta Metro 510 1.94 384 1.87 
Baton Rouge 500 1.91 387 1.89 
Birmingham Metro 500 1.91 376 1.83 
Bismarck (ND) 506 1.93 408 1.99 
Boston (City) 604 2.3 431 2.10 
Boulder (CO) 500 1.91 393 1.92 
Central Oregon 500 1.91 402 1.96 
Charlotte Region/14 County 1,500 5.72 1187 5.79 
Chicago Metro 750 2.86 549 2.68 
Cincinnati Metro 1,001 3.82 820 4.00 
Cleveland/Cuyahoga County 1,100 4.19 867 4.23 
Delaware 1,383 5.27 1105 5.39 
Denver (City/County) 501 1.91 414 2.02 
Detroit Metro/7-County 501 1.91 404 1.97 
East Tennessee 500 1.91 375 1.83 
Fremont/Newaygo County (MI) 753 2.87 614 2.99 
Grand Rapids (City) 502 1.91 436 2.13 
Greensboro/Guilford County 752 2.87 631 3.08 
Houston/Harris County 500 1.91 367 1.79 
Indiana 1,001 3.82 779 3.80 
Kalamazoo County 500 1.91 419 2.04 
Kanawha Valley (WV) 500 1.91 394 1.92 
Lewiston-Auburn (ME) 523 1.99 421 2.05 
Los Angeles County 515 1.96 395 1.93 
Minneapolis 501 1.91 407 1.98 
Montana 502 1.91 396 1.93 
New Hampshire 711 2.71 541 2.64 
North Minneapolis 452 1.72 352 1.72 
Peninsula-Silicon Valley 1,505 5.74 1206 5.88 
Phoenix/Maricopa County 501 1.91 370 1.80 
Rochester Metro (NY) 988 3.77 798 3.89 
Rural South East Dakota 368 1.4 0 0 
San Diego County 504 1.92 414 2.02 
San Francisco (City) 500 1.91 416 2.03 
Seattle 502 1.91 394 1.92 
St. Paul Metro 503 1.92 405 1.98 
Syracuse/Onondaga County 541 2.06 428 2.09 
Winston-Salem/Forsyth County 750 2.86 623 3.04 
Yakima (WA) 500 1.91 395 1.93 
York (PA) 500 1.91 402 1.96 
Total 26,230 100 20,505 100 
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TABLE A3: Second-stage regressions: Full sample (no interactions) 
 
 Dependent variable: Participation in neighborhood associations (N=20,505)
Corresponding first-stage regressions:  
Table 2  
Column (1) 
Table 2  
Columns (2)-(3) 
Table 2  
Columns (4)-(6) 
Table 2  
Columns (4)-(6)
Estimator:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS JIVE1 
Reported (key)  variables:     
0.11 ** 0.11 ** 0.27 ** 0.19 * Respondent is homeowner (0.013) (0.013) (0.087) (0.094) 
-0.011 -0.010 0.031 0.019 % Developed land in Census tract, 1992 (0.079) (0.073) (0.077) (0.053) 
0.0083 -0.017 -0.0051 -0.0082 Log (population density in developed area  
of Census tract) (0.0081) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Number of years lived in local community:     
0.042 ** 0.043 ** 0.024 (*) 0.033 (*)  1-5 years (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017) 
0.060 ** 0.061 ** 0.028 0.043 (*)  6-10 years (0.012) (0.013) (0.022) (0.024) 
0.036 ** 0.037 ** -0.0073 0.013  11-20 years (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.030) 
0.022 (*) 0.022* -0.025 -0.0037  More than 20 years (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.032) 
0.0073 0.0072 -0.036 -0.016  All life (0.014) (0.013) (0.027) (0.030) 
0.031 ** 0.030 ** 0.0077 0.018 Expect to stay in community for at least 5 
more years (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.014) (0.016) 
-0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 Respondent is commuting (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
0.0032 0.0047 0.0040 0.0044 Daily commuting time in hours  
(no commute = 0) (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0088) 
County level and demand controls:     
0.47 0.49 (*) 0.37 0.42 (*) Homeownership rate (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.24) 
-0.63 -0.74 -0.72 -0.72 (*) Gini-coefficient of income distribution (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (0.40) 
-0.085 -0.075 -0.071 -0.074 Linguistic heterogeneity (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.12) 
0.16 (*) 0.15 (*) 0.13 0.14 (*) Ethnic heterogeneity (0.091) (0.087) (0.087) (0.077) 
0.047 -0.0022 0.020 0.012 Share of housing units that are single-family 
detached homes (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
0.59 * 0.59 * 0.55 * 0.56 ** Share of housing units that are in multi-unit 
buildings (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.20) 
0.0014 * 0.0015 * 0.0013 (*) 0.0014 (*) Arrest for murder per 100,000 residents in 
county of residence (0.00066) (0.00066) (0.00069) (0.00080) 
0.015 ** 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 0.016 ** Log (population size of place to which  
resident belongs) (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0045) 
0.0030 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0029 ** Average household income in county  
in 1,000$ (0.00097) (0.00097) (0.00093) (0.00098) 
Other survey respondent specific controls:     
Race:     
0.069 ** 0.069 ** 0.077 ** 0.073 **  Black  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) 
-0.024 (*) -0.023 -0.015 -0.020  Asian  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
-0.016 -0.015 -0.018 -0.017  Hispanic (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) 
0.0093 0.010 0.014 0.012  Any other non-white (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) 
-0.0027 -0.0025 0.00058 -0.00086 Respondent is male (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0066) 
 (Continued on next page) 
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TABLE A3 (Continued) 
 
 Dependent variable: Participation in neighborhood associations (N=20,505) 
Corresponding first-stage regressions:  
Table 2  
Column (1) 
Table 2  
Columns (2)-(3) 
Table 2  
Columns (4)-(6) 
Table 2  
Columns (4)-(6)
Estimator:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS JIVE1 
0.0083 ** 0.0084 ** 0.0066 ** 0.0074 ** Age of respondent (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
-0.059 ** -0.060 ** -0.046 ** -0.052 ** Age of respondent squared (in ‘000) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
0.022 ** 0.022 ** 0.012 0.016 (*) Respondent has children (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0094) 
Total household income:      
0.021 * 0.021 * -0.0014 0.0092  $30,000-49,999 (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.013) (0.016) 
0.026 * 0.025 * -0.0086 0.0074  $50,000-74,999 (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.023) 
0.064 ** 0.062 ** 0.021 0.040  $75,000-99,999 (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.028) 
0.11 ** 0.11 ** 0.060 * 0.082 **  Over $100,000 (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.031) 
0.059 ** 0.058 ** 0.020 0.038  Over $30,000 unspecified (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) 
Marital status:     
-0.0041 -0.0034 0.013 0.0048  Never married (0.010) (0.0096) (0.014) (0.014) 
-0.016 -0.016 -0.0076 -0.012  Widowed (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
0.011 0.011 0.026 * 0.019  Marital status: Divorced (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.011) (0.013) 
-0.010 -0.010 0.014 0.0025  Marital status: Separated (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) 
Highest education completed:     
0.021 * 0.021 * 0.014 0.018  High school diploma (0.010) (0.0095) (0.010) (0.014) 
0.066 ** 0.065 ** 0.060 ** 0.062 **  Some college (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
0.080 ** 0.080 ** 0.071 ** 0.075 **  Associate degree (2 y.) or specialized (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.11 **  Bachelor’s degree (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
0.091 ** 0.091 ** 0.089 ** 0.090 **  Some graduate training (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.12 **  Graduate or professional degree (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
Current employment status:     
0.0063 0.0060 0.010 0.0080  Temporarily laid off (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
-0.052 ** -0.052 * -0.055 ** -0.054 *  Unemployed (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
0.014 0.014 0.0042 0.0087  Retired (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
0.000091 -0.00022 0.010 0.0052  Permanently disabled (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
-0.00072 -0.00046 -0.0028 -0.0018  Homemaker (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
0.0039 0.0054 -0.0065 -0.0011  Student (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) 
Community sample fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-0.73 (*) -0.84 * -0.69 (*) -0.74 * Constant (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.32) 
F: Share developed 11.5 11.5 8.6  
  Own   10.7  
 Log (pop. dens.)  139.5 77.9  
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  180.4 135.1 9.2  
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TABLE A4: First-stage regressions: MSA-only sample 
 
 Dependent Variables (Endogenous variables in 2nd stage) 
 Share Developed 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) Own 
Excluded Instruments       
Share wetlands in Census tract -2.24 ** -2.24 ** -0.038 -2.28 ** -0.044 0.27 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.46) (0.35) (0.46) (0.17) 
Topography: flat plains 0.10 * 0.15 ** -0.039 0.15 ** -0.041 -0.056 (*) 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.060) (0.044) (0.061) (0.031) 
Topography: smooth plains 0.15 ** 0.14 ** -0.16 ** 0.13 ** -0.17 ** 0.026 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.062) (0.037) (0.062) (0.026) 
Topography: irregular plains 0.082 * 0.093 ** -0.061 * 0.091 ** -0.061 * -0.021 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.016) 
0.089 ** 0.11 ** 0.022 0.12 ** 0.027 -0.021 Topography: tablelands, moderate 
relief (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.039) (0.026) 
0.073 ** 0.050 * -0.012 0.049 * -0.012 -0.014 Topography: plains with hills 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.065) (0.024) (0.065) (0.042) 
 -0.19 ** 0.94 ** -0.19 ** 0.94 ** 0.045 * Log (population density in developed 
area of county)  (0.032) (0.050) (0.033) (0.050) (0.018) 
   3.91 ** 1.12 2.28 * Total mortgage subsidy rate (2000) ×  
dummy (HH income < $20,000)    (1.35) (1.80) (1.03) 
   3.87 ** 1.00 2.57 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($20,000 - $30,000)    (1.35) (1.80) (1.02) 
   3.87 ** 1.05 2.60 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy (< $30,000, unspecified)    (1.36) (1.79) (1.05) 
   4.01 ** 1.19 2.48 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($30,000 - $50,000)    (1.34) (1.75) (0.93) 
   3.82 ** 1.49 1.57 Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($50,000 - $75,000)    (1.35) (1.78) (0.96) 
   3.62 ** 1.42 2.37 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy ($75,000 - $100,000)    (1.38) (1.85) (0.94) 
   4.58 ** 1.19 2.63 * Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy (> $100,000)    (1.34) (1.86) (1.08) 
   4.02 ** 3.36 (*) 2.07 (*) Total mortgage subsidy rate ×  
dummy (> $30,000, unspecified)    (1.43) (2.00) (1.15) 
Included Instruments       
-0.0068      Log (population density in developed 
area of tract) (0.023)      
Respondent is homeowner -0.059 ** -0.059 ** -0.031 *    
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)    
0.011 0.0098 0.038 (*) 0.0031 0.035 (*) 0.11 ** Lived in local community 
1-5 years (omitted: less than 1 y.) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.020) (0.0074) (0.019) (0.014) 
0.019 * 0.017 * 0.032 0.0055 0.027 0.20 ** Lived in local community 
6-10 years (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.021) (0.0073) (0.020) (0.015) 
0.039 ** 0.037 ** 0.037 (*) 0.022 ** 0.030 0.28 ** Lived in local community 
11-20 years (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.019) (0.0072) (0.018) (0.019) 
0.043 ** 0.042 ** 0.026 0.024 ** 0.017 0.31 ** Lived in local community 
more than 20 years (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.019) (0.0076) (0.018) (0.018) 
0.051 ** 0.048 ** 0.013 0.033 * 0.0072 0.27 ** Lived in local community 
all life (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) 
-0.014 ** -0.014 ** -0.018 * -0.022 ** -0.022 * 0.15 ** Expect to stay in community for at 
least 5 more years (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0093) (0.0047) (0.0094) (0.011) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE A4 (Continued) 
 
 Dependent Variables (Endogenous variables in 2nd stage) 
 Share Developed 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) 
Share 
Developed 
Log (Pop. 
Density) Own 
Respondent is commuting 0.018 * 0.017 * 0.0094 0.018 * 0.0094 -0.0062 
 (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.016) (0.0073) (0.016) (0.015) 
-0.031 ** -0.030 ** 0.034 ** -0.031 ** 0.033 ** 0.0044 Daily commuting time in hours  
(no commute = 0) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.012) (0.0058) (0.012) (0.0095) 
0.58 0.68 (*) 2.87 ** 0.54 2.84 ** 0.31 
Homeownership rate in county 
(0.43) (0.37) (0.51) (0.34) (0.51) (0.31) 
1.03 0.022 1.74 * -0.016 1.73 * 0.32 Gini-coefficient of income 
distribution in county (0.87) (0.86) (0.69) (0.79) (0.68) (0.43) 
0.016 0.12 0.30 0.19 0.33 -0.22 
Linguistic heterogeneity in county 
(0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) 
0.19 0.091 -0.14 0.18 -0.10 0.23 (*) 
Ethnic heterogeneity in county 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) 
0.35 0.014 0.41 -0.024 0.39 -0.028 Share of units that are single-family 
detached homes in county (0.23) (0.24) (0.35) (0.24) (0.36) (0.21) 
1.02 ** 1.22 ** 1.04 * 1.02 ** 0.98 * -0.33 Share of units that are in multi-unit 
buildings in county (0.34) (0.31) (0.41) (0.31) (0.44) (0.22) 
0.00024 0.00094 -0.0041 ** 0.00037 -0.0043 ** 0.000019 Arrests for murder per 100,000 
residents (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.00055) 
0.042 ** 0.042 ** 0.10 ** 0.042 ** 0.10 ** -0.0086 ** Log (population size of place to 
which tract belongs) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.013) (0.0061) (0.013) (0.0022) 
0.00024 0.00063 -0.012 ** 0.00042 -0.012 ** -0.00058 Average household income in county 
in 1,000$ (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0012) 
Demographic controls: race, sex, 
age, age2, marital status, children Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Socioeconomic controls (dummies): 
income, education, employment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.21 * -1.86 ** -3.91 ** -3.36 ** -4.32 ** -0.94 (*) 
 (0.58) (0.49) (0.71) (0.61) (0.89) (0.53) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.34 
Notes: Sample size based on MSA-only specifications reported in Table 4. N=18,028. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) 
are clustered by Census counties (cluster size=393).  ** Significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; (*) significant at 10%. Bold 
coefficients are excluded instruments used to specifically identify the (endogenous) dependent variables. 
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TABLE A5: Second-stage regressions: MSA-only sample (no interactions) 
 
 Dependent variable: Participation in neighborhood associations (N=18,028)
Corresponding first-stage regressions:  
Table A5  
Column (1) 
Table A5  
Columns (2)-(3) 
Table A5  
Columns (4)-(6) 
Table A5  
Columns (4)-(6)
Estimator:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS JIVE1 
Reported (key)  variables:     
0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.29 ** 0.20 * Respondent is homeowner (0.013) (0.013) (0.086) (0.095) 
0.049 0.036 0.081 0.066 %-Developed land in Census tract, 1992 (0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.050) 
0.0063 -0.026 -0.012 -0.017 Log (population density in developed area  
of Census tract) (0.0080) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) 
Number of years lived in local community:     
0.038 ** 0.039 ** 0.020 0.029  1-5 years (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) 
0.054 ** 0.055 ** 0.020 0.037  6-10 years (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.025) 
0.032 ** 0.033 ** -0.015 0.0081  11-20 years (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.031) 
0.021 0.022 -0.031 -0.0055  More than 20 years (0.014) (0.015) (0.029) (0.033) 
0.0060 0.0067 -0.042 -0.019  All life (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.032) 
0.028 ** 0.028 ** 0.0033 0.015 Expect to stay in community for at least 5 
more years (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.014) (0.016) 
-0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 Respondent is commuting (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
0.00016 0.00099 0.00096 0.0012 Daily commuting time in hours  
(no commute = 0) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0094) 
County level and demand controls:     
0.26 0.36 0.21 0.27 Homeownership rate (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) 
-1.34 ** -1.45 ** -1.46 ** -1.46 ** Gini-coefficient of income distribution (0.51) (0.53) (0.49) (0.51) 
-0.096 -0.073 -0.054 -0.065 Linguistic heterogeneity (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) 
0.20 (*) 0.18 (*) 0.15 0.16 (*) Ethnic heterogeneity (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.096) 
0.080 0.048 0.064 0.055 Share of housing units that are single-family 
detached homes (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
0.53 * 0.61 * 0.55 * 0.56 * Share of housing units that are in multi-unit 
buildings (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) 
0.0015 * 0.0016 * 0.0015 * 0.0015 (*) Arrest for murder per 100,000 residents in 
county of residence (0.00068) (0.00069) (0.00071) (0.00085) 
0.014 ** 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 0.016 ** Log (population size of place to which  
resident belongs) (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0052) 
0.0031 ** 0.0028 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0029 * Average household income in county  
in 1,000$ (0.00098) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Other survey respondent specific controls:     
Race:     
0.067 ** 0.067 ** 0.076 ** 0.071 **  Black  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) 
-0.021 -0.018 -0.012 -0.016  Asian  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
-0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014  Hispanic (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) 
0.0049 0.0056 0.010 0.0080  Any other non-white (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) 
-0.0035 -0.0034 0.0010 -0.0011 Respondent is male (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0072) 
 (Continued on next page) 
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TABLE A5 (Continued) 
 
 Dependent variable: Participation in neighborhood associations (N=18,028) 
Corresponding first-stage regressions:  
Table A5  
Column (1) 
Table A5  
Columns (2)-(3) 
Table A5  
Columns (4)-(6) 
Table A5  
Columns (4)-(6)
Estimator:  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS JIVE1 
0.0091 ** 0.0092 ** 0.0073 ** 0.0082 ** Age of respondent (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
-0.065 ** -0.066 ** -0.052 ** -0.059 ** Age of respondent squared (in ‘000) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
0.023 ** 0.023 ** 0.011 0.017 (*) Respondent has children (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0082) (0.010) 
Total household income:      
0.021 * 0.021 * -0.0042 0.0081  $30,000-49,999 (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) 
0.032 ** 0.031 ** -0.0066 0.012  $50,000-74,999 (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) 
0.070 ** 0.068 ** 0.022 0.045  $75,000-99,999 (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.030) 
0.11 ** 0.11 ** 0.061 * 0.087 **  Over $100,000 (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.033) 
0.063 ** 0.062 ** 0.019 0.040  Over $30,000 unspecified (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.031) 
Marital status:     
-0.010 -0.0088 0.0079 -0.00058  Never married (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.013) (0.014) 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.0034 -0.0079  Widowed (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
0.0090 0.010 0.026 * 0.018  Marital status: Divorced (0.0098) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
-0.016 -0.016 0.0080 -0.0038  Marital status: Separated (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) 
Highest education completed:     
0.025 * 0.025 * 0.017 0.021  High school diploma (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
0.069 ** 0.068 ** 0.062 ** 0.065 **  Some college (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
0.084 ** 0.084 ** 0.074 ** 0.079 **  Associate degree (2 y.) or specialized (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.12 **  Bachelor’s degree (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
0.085 ** 0.084 ** 0.082 ** 0.083 **  Some graduate training (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.12 **  Graduate or professional degree (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
Current employment status:     
-0.0045 -0.0047 -0.00049 -0.0026  Temporarily laid off (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
-0.067 ** -0.065 ** -0.068 ** -0.067 **  Unemployed (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) 
0.0027 0.0036 -0.0073 -0.0022  Retired (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
-0.0073 -0.0068 0.0046 -0.0010  Permanently disabled (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) 
-0.010 -0.0094 -0.011 -0.010  Homemaker (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
0.0038 0.0053 -0.0077 -0.0014  Student (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) 
Community sample fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-0.38 -0.62 -0.43 -0.50 Constant (0.44) (0.48) (0.46) (0.45) 
F: Share developed 15.6 19.3 12.1  
  Own   12.1  
 Log (pop. dens.)  78.7 39.2  
Cragg-Donald F-statistic  217.5 99.0 9.4  
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TABLE A6: Estimates of the determinants of social interactions with co-workers outside work 
 
 OLS, no interaction: own ×% developed OLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 2SLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) MSA (5) (6) (7) (8) MSA (9) (10) (11) (12) MSA 
-0.18 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.16 ** -0.098 (*) -0.099 (*) -0.078 -0.29 * -0.18 -0.21 (*) -0.20 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.062) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) 
    -0.041 -0.050 -0.059 -0.089 0.19 0.075 0.13 0.11 Own ×  share developed 
    (0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.071) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) 
-0.038 -0.035 -0.042 -0.031 -0.0074 0.0018 0.0014 0.035 -0.18 -0.14 -0.22 -0.24 Share developed 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.063) (0.058) (0.059) (0.070) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.26) 
 0.034 0.037 (*) 0.027  0.032 0.035 0.024  0.039 (*) 0.21 ** 0.23 * Log (pop. density in 
developed area)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.025)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)  (0.023) (0.067) (0.11) 
 0.013 0.011 -0.0085  0.013 0.010 -0.010  0.012 0.0093 -0.011 Lived in community 
1-5 years   (0.041) (0.041) (0.043)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
 0.11 * 0.10 * 0.10 *  0.11 * 0.10 * 0.10 *  0.11 * 0.11 * 0.11 * Lived in community 
6-10 years  (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)  (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)  (0.044) (0.046) (0.049) 
 0.088 * 0.078 * 0.066 (*)  0.087 * 0.078 * 0.066 (*)  0.080 * 0.079 * 0.069 (*) Lived in community 
11-20 years  (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)  (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) 
 0.12 ** 0.10 ** 0.086 *  0.12 ** 0.10 ** 0.085 *  0.10 ** 0.11 ** 0.092 * Lived in community 
more than 20 years  (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) 
 0.12 * 0.11 * 0.091 (*)  0.12 * 0.11 * 0.091 (*)  0.11 * 0.12 * 0.10 * Lived in community 
all life  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)  (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) 
  0.044 (*) 0.055 *   0.045 (*) 0.055 *  0.043 0.043 0.056 * Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years   (0.026) (0.027)   (0.026) (0.027)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) 
  -0.080 ** -0.078 **   -0.080 ** -0.079 **  -0.080 ** -0.090 ** -0.089 ** Daily commuting time 
  (0.026) (0.028)   (0.026) (0.028)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls a) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2.07 ** 2.26 * 2.33 * 1.90 2.05 ** 2.24 * 2.30 * 1.85 2.2 ** 2.31 * 3.10 ** 3.12 * Constant 
(0.068) (0.95) (0.95) (1.28) (0.083) (0.95) (0.95) (1.28) (0.17) (0.96) (0.92) (1.33) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.016 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.016 0.11 0.11 0.12     
F:  Share developed         14.7 6.9 6.9 9.4 
 Own× share developed         18.4 14.1 13.1 16.2 
 Log (pop. dens.)           70.3 46.4 
Cragg-Donald F-stat         131.5 65.9 55.6 39.4 
Notes: Dependent variable in log-form. N=13,491 (full sample) and 12,021 (MSA only). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties (cluster size=333/203).  **/ */ 
(*) Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Excluded instruments are documented in Table 2. All specifications reported in columns (9) to (12) comfortably pass the 
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio-test and the Hansen J-overidentification test. a) Appendix Table A1 reports the full set of coefficients for specification (11). 
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TABLE A7: Estimates of the determinants of participation in service or fraternal organizations 
 
 OLS, no interaction: own ×% developed OLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 2SLS, with interaction: own ×% developed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) MSA (5) (6) (7) (8) MSA (9) (10) (11) (12) MSA 
0.037 ** 0.00046 0.00045 -0.0018 0.035 ** 0.011 0.011 0.0017 0.0050 -0.018 -0.019 -0.042 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) 
    0.0025 -0.017 -0.017 -0.0055 0.057 0.031 0.034 0.061 Own ×  share developed 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.048) 
0.001 -0.0031 -0.0028 0.00026 -0.00072 0.010 0.010 0.0042 -0.019 -0.026 -0.027 -0.058 Share developed 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.036) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) 
 -0.017 ** -0.018 ** -0.019 **  -0.018 ** -0.018 ** -0.019 **  -0.017 ** -0.012 -0.010 Log (pop. density in 
developed area)  (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0050)  (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0049)  (0.0047) (0.018) (0.028) 
 -0.00033 -0.00028 0.0041  -0.00055 -0.00051 0.0040  0.00014 0.000044 0.0050 Lived in community 
1-5 years   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.0099) (0.010) (0.010) 
 0.0086 0.0087 0.0085  0.0084 0.0085 0.0084  0.0091 0.0090 0.010 Lived in community 
6-10 years  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 0.019 (*) 0.019 (*) 0.020 (*)  0.019 (*) 0.019 (*) 0.020 (*)  0.019 (*) 0.019 (*) 0.021 (*) Lived in community 
11-20 years  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
 0.035 ** 0.035 ** 0.038 **  0.035 ** 0.035 ** 0.038 **  0.035 ** 0.035 ** 0.039 ** Lived in community 
more than 20 years  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.031 **  0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.031 **  0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.032 ** Lived in community 
all life  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
  -0.000071 0.00073   0.00012 0.00077  -0.00042 -0.00038 0.00023 Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years   (0.0066) (0.0070)   (0.0066) (0.0070)  (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0071) 
  0.0048 0.0077   0.0046 0.0076  0.0051 0.0049 0.0074 Daily commuting time 
  (0.0057) (0.0060)   (0.0057) (0.0060)  (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0059) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls a) No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0.092 ** 0.070 0.069 0.083 0.094 ** 0.063 0.062 0.080 0.099 ** 0.081 0.10 0.14 Constant 
(0.012) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29) (0.013) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29) (0.030) (0.24) (0.25) (0.35) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0089 0.052 0.053 0.055 0.0089 0.053 0.053 0.055     
F:  Share developed         17.0 8.4 8.5 11.3 
 Own× share developed         22.5 18.0 17.3 20.7 
 Log (pop. dens.)           84.9 46.3 
Cragg-Donald F-stat         199.3 100.0 84.4 55.7 
Notes: N=20,505 (full sample) and 18,031 (MSA only). Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by Census counties (cluster size=393/230).  **/ */ (*) Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
Bold coefficients are instrumented. Excluded instruments are documented in Table 2. All specifications reported in columns (9) to (12) comfortably pass the Anderson canonical correlations 
likelihood-ratio-test and the Hansen J-overidentification test. a) Appendix Table A1 reports the full set of coefficients for specification (11). 
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TABLE A8: JIVE1-Estimates with endogenous homeownership variable 
 
 Social Interactions with Neighbors Participation in Neighborhood Groups Social Interactions with Co-Workers Participation in Fraternal/Service Ass. 
 (1) (2) (3) MSA (4) (5) (6) MSA (7) (8) (9) MSA (10) (11) (12) MSA 
-1.72 ** -1.60 ** -1.41 * -0.24 -0.27 (*) -0.37 * 0.28 0.35 0.22 -0.014 -0.017 0.059 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.60) (0.59) (0.64) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25) (0.27) (0.47) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
1.84 ** 1.69 ** 1.76 * 0.51 ** 0.54 ** 0.68 ** 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.18 0.078 Own ×  share developed 
(0.64) (0.63) (0.73) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.28) (0.29) (0.47) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) 
-1.63 ** -1.50 ** -1.43 * -0.34 ** -0.36 ** -0.45 ** -0.15 -0.17 -0.23 -0.12 -0.12 -0.050 Share developed 
(0.52) (0.50) (0.58) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.26) (0.27) (0.39) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
-0.0076 -0.069 0.11 0.025 ** -0.0049 0.023 0.058 * 0.18 * 0.21 (*) -0.011 (*) -0.0083 -0.0035 Log (pop. density in 
developed area) (0.031) (0.082) (0.13) (0.0077) (0.020) (0.032) (0.026) (0.082) (0.11) (0.0063) (0.016) (0.026) 
0.52 ** 0.52 ** 0.42 ** 0.053 ** 0.056 ** 0.055 ** -0.052 -0.062 -0.068 -0.0080 -0.0079 -0.0074 Lived in community 
1-5 years  (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.055) (0.057) (0.061) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
0.71 ** 0.70 ** 0.60 ** 0.074 ** 0.078 ** 0.076 ** -0.014 -0.028 -0.0040 -0.0074 -0.0071 -0.013 Lived in community 
6-10 years (0.092) (0.092) (0.094) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.074) (0.077) (0.085) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
0.75 ** 0.75 ** 0.61 ** 0.048 (*) 0.053 * 0.053 (*) -0.076 -0.095 -0.078 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.010 Lived in community 
11-20 years (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.086) (0.089) (0.098) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
0.74 ** 0.73 ** 0.61 ** 0.035 0.040 0.043 -0.054 -0.069 -0.060 0.0092 0.0095 0.0044 Lived in community 
more than 20 years (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.086) (0.089) (0.10) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
0.73 ** 0.72 ** 0.59 ** 0.019 0.023 0.026 -0.041 -0.054 -0.044 0.0078 0.0081 0.00091 Lived in community 
all life (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.089) (0.093) (0.10) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
0.33 ** 0.33 ** 0.31 ** 0.032 * 0.034 * 0.031 * -0.048 -0.058 -0.029 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.050) (0.052) (0.056) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
-0.087 * -0.085 * -0.074 (*) 0.010 0.012 0.0064 -0.082 ** -0.091 ** -0.086 ** 0.0057 0.0058 0.0074 Daily commuting time 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0077) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1.48 1.18 3.14 (*) -0.49 -0.62 (*) -0.057 3.48 ** 4.16 ** 3.38 * 0.18 0.19 0.23 Constant 
(1.24) (1.28) (1.88) (0.30) (0.32) (0.46) (1.13) (1.26) (1.63) (0.25) (0.26) (0.37) 
Observations 20424 20424 17963 20505 20505 18028 13491 13491 12021 20505 20505 18031 
Notes: **/ */ (*) Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Bold coefficients are instrumented. The sets of instruments used to identify the endogenous variables are documented in Table 2. Quantitative effects 
and statistical significance levels are very similar if a JIVE2-estimator is used instead of the JIVE1-estimator.  
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TABLE A9: MSA-only sample results using MSA-level population density in developed area to identify tract-level density 
 
 Social Interactions with Neighbors Participation in Neigh. Groups Social Interactions with Co-Workers Participation in Fraternal/Service Ass. 
 (1)  2SLS (2) 2SLS (3) JIVE1 (4)  2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) JIVE1 (7)  2SLS (8) 2SLS (9) JIVE1 (10)  2SLS (11) 2SLS (12) JIVE1 
-0.25 -1.48 * -1.46 * -0.038 -0.23 (*) -0.38 * -0.20 -0.21 0.22 -0.049 -0.025 0.079 Respondent is homeowner 
(0.24) (0.65) (0.62) (0.073) (0.13) (0.16) (0.19) (0.57) (0.47) (0.039) (0.15) (0.13) 
0.81 * 1.83 ** 1.67 * 0.24 * 0.59 ** 0.65 ** 0.11 0.62 0.29 0.074 0.20 0.11 Own ×  share developed 
(0.37) (0.65) (0.72) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.29) (0.60) (0.47) (0.060) (0.17) (0.16) 
-0.55 (*) -1.46 ** -1.37 * -0.14 (*) -0.40 ** -0.47 ** -0.20 -0.48 -0.22 -0.063 -0.13 -0.064 Share developed 
(0.33) (0.55) (0.57) (0.086) (0.12) (0.14) (0.26) (0.51) (0.39) (0.054) (0.14) (0.12) 
0.032 -0.0021 -0.082 0.047 -0.010 -0.026 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.022 0.077 0.070 Log (pop. density in 
developed area) (0.28) (0.22) (0.25) (0.10) (0.075) (0.064) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19) (0.070) (0.056) (0.054) 
0.34 ** 0.43 ** 0.44 ** 0.041 ** 0.045 ** 0.059 ** -0.011 -0.042 -0.068 0.0041 -0.0071 -0.014 Lived in community 
1-5 years  (0.057) (0.062) (0.072) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.043) (0.054) (0.062) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
0.47 ** 0.61 ** 0.62 ** 0.058 ** 0.059 ** 0.082 ** 0.11 * 0.046 -0.0044 0.0090 -0.011 -0.022 Lived in community 
6-10 years (0.064) (0.093) (0.096) (0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.049) (0.082) (0.086) (0.010) (0.017) (0.021) 
0.45 ** 0.62 ** 0.64 ** 0.034 ** 0.030 0.061 * 0.067 (*) -0.020 -0.079 0.020 (*) -0.0092 -0.024 Lived in community 
11-20 years (0.065) (0.10) (0.12) (0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.040) (0.10) (0.10) (0.012) (0.024) (0.025) 
0.43 ** 0.62 ** 0.65 ** 0.023 (*) 0.018 0.052 (*) 0.090 * 0.0039 -0.060 0.038 ** 0.0066 -0.0094 Lived in community 
more than 20 years (0.065) (0.11) (0.12) (0.014) (0.029) (0.031) (0.039) (0.097) (0.10) (0.012) (0.025) (0.027) 
0.43 ** 0.60 ** 0.62 ** 0.0088 0.0030 0.034 0.098 (*) 0.015 -0.045 0.032 ** 0.0042 -0.010 Lived in community 
all life (0.065) (0.10) (0.12) (0.015) (0.029) (0.030) (0.050) (0.10) (0.10) (0.011) (0.023) (0.026) 
0.24 ** 0.31 ** 0.32 ** 0.027 ** 0.018 0.033 * 0.057 * 0.0065 -0.029 0.00083 -0.014 -0.021 (*) Expect to stay for at least 5 
more years (0.037) (0.071) (0.058) (0.0067) (0.014) (0.015) (0.028) (0.051) (0.056) (0.0074) (0.013) (0.012) 
-0.078 (*) -0.068 (*) -0.067 (*) 0.00048 0.0057 0.0069 -0.088 ** -0.085 ** -0.085 ** 0.0065 0.0060 0.0050 Daily commuting time 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.010) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0083) 
Individual-, county-level, 
and demand controls a) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community sample FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2.67 2.38 1.75 -0.047 -0.33 -0.46 3.28 (*) 4.26 * 3.45 (*) 0.37 0.83 0.77 Constant 
(2.56) (2.10) (2.43) (0.78) (0.66) (0.61) (1.95) (1.80) (1.98) (0.57) (0.51) (0.52) 
F:  Share developed 10.7 26.3  10.6 27.4  8.5 75.4  10.6 27.4  
 Own ×  share developed 21.2 29.6  21.1 28.0  16.2 45.2  21.1 28.1  
 Own  65.8   65.4   63.5   65.2  
 Log (pop. dens.) 3.5 18.8  3.5 18.9  2.6 17.3  3.5 18.9  
Cragg-Donald F-stat 10.3 2.2  10.3 2.2  7.0 1.6  10.3 2.2  
Notes: Bold coefficients are instrumented. N = 17,963 (columns 1-3), N = 18,028 (columns 4-6), N = 12,021 (columns 7-9), N = 18,031 (columns 10-12). 
 
 
 
